Will Russia resist the temptations of imperial glory?

Since the 18th century, regardless of the doctrine of her managers, Russia is a major power. Expressed on a dial, the indicator oscillates between “dominant” and “major”. Accordingly, world affairs are co-determined by Moscow while our liberty and Russia’s internal order are interrelated. 

The above is true regardless of whether the Kremlin achieves its goals or not. Charles 12th, Napoleon in Moscow and the Crimean War were mere flickers and defeat in 1917 only an interruption. Self-imposed routs, such as the civil war after the trouncing in WWI, Leninism, Stalinism, or Brezhnev’s stagnation, have not arrested the roll of the train.

The reader might infer that one wants to convince him of two things. They are that “Russia cannot be vanquished” and that one should be “afraid” of her. The implication would be the need for a prophylactic war against the land of the eleven time zones. The kind of Russia Europe will experience will be partly of its own making. Even for the USA, beyond “Europe”, Russia is the most desirable ally. Here it is more telling than entertaining that Kissinger had no number to dial “Europe”.

Past ambitions and successes could have an attraction that revives old projects of domination into a program for the future. Should weak and small potential dependencies encourage expansion, then the impulse will be counterproductive. The more threatening Russia is, the more resistance she creates. Nothing can further the hostile cohesion of the West than seeming threats from Moscow. 

A good case can be made that Russia’s national interest needs examination. Most entities with an imperial potential have failed to formulate an honestly held goal limiting their ambitions. Influence based on trust can extend a country’s reach without paying a high price. In practice, however, knowing where to stop pushing and when to begin to lure has been undermined by the vision of grandeur. The misuse of power, by extending it beyond the limit of necessity, has shaped our world. 

Europe’s continued weakness is as much a temptation to Moscow as is the lost sphere of influence. This opens enticing opportunities. Currently, a united Europe is sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratic expansion and for the creating a nation in a zone defined by ethnic entities. The cases of the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires show that such projects fail in modern times. However, the weakening of Nato and of Atlanticism indicates a vacuum to be filled. 

A good case can be made why partnership with Europe/US is a Russian interest. Building a modern society benefits from cooperation and from the removal of the tensions of suspicion. The mirror image of this is that it is a European interest to further Russia’s democratic development and a modern economic order there. Europe’s prospects are limited by the extent of Russia’s modernization. 

Alas, the evidence suggests that, regardless of its hither high price, the imperial instinct might not be overcome. Those who drive the Kremlin forward through the rear view mirror want attention. They do so through threats and not as partners that influence through persuasion. The result is a role in global affairs that blocks potential partners, and it hinders democracy through the support of felt-to-be-kin tyrannies. Moscow uses its power to oppose developments that, if allowed to unfold domestically, would further modernization and overcome oligarchy. The upshot is Soviet-smelling policies that endeavor to improve on old and failed methods. 

In a world order that inches toward democracy and pacific crisis management, a West that covets her as a partner does not threaten Russia. Regardless of that, along with China that shares her left totalitarian past, in critical situations Moscow tends to block the democratization of the international realm. Democracy abroad is still viewed as an internal threat to Russia’s system. Security through might in a world of enemies seems more convincing than cooperation with like-minded democracies. This frame of mind makes internal and external security based on power appear to be less risky than the turbulence that comes with liberty as a system. Democracy might be a guarantee of security. However, believing this takes courage. It is not a natural conclusion of a past full of conquests when strong that alternated with periods of subjugation when feeble.

The inherited crisis management reflex of authoritarians is expressed by the recent positions taken in Russia’s name. The record ranges from the trivial, such as munitions manufacture in Cuba, to the consequential, such as, in accord with China, the blocking of sanctions against Syria or Iran. The recent persecution of election observers fits the pattern. Such cases suggest that dictatorial rule at home has a foreign policy equivalent. That makes a democratic Russia into the best security against Russian expansionism. Someday, Russia will discover that even in her case, zones of influence held by power become a threat once their control must be relaxed. Free neighbors are the best protector. Until Russia’s governors internalize this idea, she will continue to seek self-respect and strength by weakening others.

It takes boldness to mount the courage to be small. In this case “small” is a relative term and connotes that the maximalist concept of empire is to be abandoned. At the same time, the retreat behind natural boundaries allows freedom to thrive. Once force is not needed to hold together what strives to drift apart, the benefit is consensual security and room for a free market that can feed a free people.