By its fruits you will know the tree of Kyoto. Once you know it, you will be able to make an informed, rational decision whether to pursue a post-2012 “son of Kyoto” or alternative strategies to address the ages-old challenge of climate change.

The main supporter of the 1997 climate treaty is the European Union. Despite the official, optimistic stand on its ability to meet reduction targets, the EU’s own figures show it is not likely to comply with Kyoto. According to the European Environmental Agency, in 2003 (the last year for which data are available) the EU-15 emissions were 1.7% below the 1990 levels. This is well above a hypothetical linear target path for steadily reducing emissions to the promised point. Worse, emissions aren’t decreasing, but since 2000 are on the rise.

 

Just four countries of the EU-15 – France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden – report being below their target paths under the EU’s “burden sharing” agreement, which reallocated Kyoto promises to spread around certain “one-off ” reductions unrelated to Kyoto. Under no scenario is it likely that the collective goal of 8% below 1990 levels will be met, unless one takes at face value claims that miracle “planned additional measures” will suddenly and dramatically reduce Europe’s emissions.

With the Montreal conference adopting the “Marrakesh Accords” and its penalties for non-compliance, it is unlikely that any subsequent cuts could be met, either.

The circumstances of the four largest emitters paint a clear picture of Europe’s dilemma. Between 1990 and 2003, the U.K. decreased its emissions by 13.3% and Germany by 18.5%, while Italy’s emissions rose by 11.6% and France cut them by 1.9%. Most of the reductions took place before the 1997 Kyoto agreement and have nothing to do with climate policies. The U.K. is still riding the shift from coal to natural gas in energy production; France relies for some 80% of its electricity production on nuclear power; Germany benefits from the 1990 baseline year: After the 1991 reunification, a major effort was undertaken to replace the inefficient industrial plants with more efficient and cleaner technologies.

Moreover, between 2002 and 2003 overall European emissions rose mainly for two reasons: increased use of coal in power production due to high oil and gas prices, compounded by a particularly cold winter (no comment on the irony). According to the EEA projections, with existing measures European emissions in 2012 will be 7% above targets. Yet just this week the EEA again trumpeted a fantastic compliance scenario under the oft-invoked but elusive “additional measures.”

Of course, Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas might reply that the EU will do its best in the next few years to meet the Kyoto targets. The emissions trading scheme is now in place (experiencing the industry-predicted, Commission-denied high quota prices) and further measures will be taken to decrease the Old Continent’s reliance on fossil fuels. Fair enough. Unfortunately, those measures – without which the Kyoto targets will never be met – are not without costs.

Macroeconomic and general equilibrium models project the economic impact of the Kyoto Protocol in Europe may range from 0.5% to 2% less GDP yearly in 2010. Other estimates on the impact on member states suggest even more. The Brussels-based think-tank International Council for Capital Formation estimates that complying with Kyoto might cost as much as 2% GDP for Italy, 1% GDP for the U.K. and 3% GDP for Spain yearly in 2010. This means recession for some.

One might object that no sacrifice is too much when it comes to saving the planet, but not even the most fervent green dares say Kyoto would have even a detectable impact on climate. It is “the first of 30 steps,” although calamity is, allegedly, already upon us. Kyoto’s ineffectiveness, accepting the most lurid assumptions, is because even if the “Kyoto 34” developed countries met their goals, global emissions would decrease by a negligible amount. This reduction is consumed by growth in emissions from emerging, exempt economies such as China and India.

Those within Europe who perceive the United States as a partner rather than a political foe should move their union toward finding a long-term, prodevelopment, pro-technology answer to the threat of climate change. While not likely to publicly emerge in Montreal, such an approach is the only ticket out of dead-end talks over an international treaty that most countries in the world reject and others clearly are set to violate.

Deadlock may be a good thing for a Kyoto industry enjoying its annual junkets to pleasant cities around the world but it offers nothing for the economy or the environment.

This article first appeared in (Canada’s) National Post of 6 December 2005