Foreign affairs – whether referring to the classical relationships to neighbors, the recent past’s regionalism, or today’s globalism - are neglected in democracies. We live in an age in which not cosmopolitans but the locally-minded determine public decisions. Indeed, “all politics have become local.” Democracies are locally inspired and are therefore apt to ignore world affairs. Correspondingly, the polity’s global role and the implications for its welfare are unseen when the (under informed) citizen decides how the power delegated to government is to be used.

The upshot ignores clear “signals” in favor of blissful inaction, until the shock of consensually overlooked threats materializes. Typically this is followed by a search for someone to be held responsible for implementing the earlier will of the newly amnesiac majority. It ends with a purge of those who only did what they were told. Significantly, this tendency – it lead to the “collapse of Europe”, Pearl Harbor, “the loss of China” followed by the “loss of Central Europe” after 1945 – remains uncorrected. Consequently, the system-embedded error is repeated.

Coupled to “democratization” is the post-medieval tend of globalization. The masses are asked to judge global matters and it appears that their role has not benefited the average man. To stay in power politicians have to bear good news. Furthermore, “leaders” get approval locally on domestic issues: foreign policy competence has little impact. The (avoidable) road to WW2 makes the point. Chamberlain and Daladier had acted in tune with their constituents’ views that they shared. Once “appeasement” crashed they were dismissed by those who had cheered them. The same people who held Churchill in the political morgue put him in power to applaud a course earlier labeled as extremist. FDR’s contribution to the Cold War has comparable components. He made foreign policy on the basis of his considerable domestic acumen. The home-turf experience made his course “democratic” while internationally he misread the smoke signals that cluttered the sky.

The Korean non-war which is the mother of subsequent American failures (Indo China, and now Iraq in progress) fits the pattern. Acting within the framework of America’s tradition, the nation fought for the restoration of the pre-war status quo –currently for “extrication” – but not really for victory. At its origins the spirit of the Gettysburg Address scores as statesmanship. In other political cultures the posture reduces the risk for the aggressor by suggesting that the full power of the USA is unlikely to be applied to foes that are a bit more subtle than Hitler had been. Call this self-castration.

The American and generally the majority-shaped world-view (include Europe here) has not been a reliable guide to foreign policy. No wonder. Majorities know what they want to hear and they terminate the political life of those who report drizzles before the storm hits. Furthermore, majorities are – with their consent – under-informed and misinformed. You can get a grasp of this by comparing the news of CNN USA and CNN International. The world affairs deficiency corresponds to the population’s interests and the politicians’ awareness. It is not funny but a symptom of a weakness when a major party’s foreign policy expert in Congress confuses Sweden and Switzerland in an ongoing matter. Language deficiency and restrictive living experience, as well as a limiting circle of personal connections, support the frailty. The result is a distorted picture that serves as a shaky basis for decisions.

These observations bring us to our own day. Let it be assumed that “Iraq” was the determining issue of the mid-term elections. If so, terrorism that had already decided an election (in Spain) has had a major impact on another vote. A further subject to be brought up relates to this writer’s motives. I have, after the military phase of the intervention, once terrorism began to unfurl, posted a rather successful piece (at intellectualconservative.com, 13 May 2004) It argued that America’s national interest had been served by removing Hussein. Nation building was an Iraqi and not primarily a US interest. The rise of terrorism was evidence that Iraqi society is not mature enough for a democratic consensus. Tacitly the majority supported the opposition to modernization by the means of terrorism. Combating it to impose what presupposed a conscious majority’s approval, implied a contradiction. Besides the limping logic, America’s system reduced her chances of prevailing in the pursuit of a goal that did not deserve to be her primary purpose.

The result of the mid-term elections for the US is that the Iraq problem is headed for a solution wrapped in phrase-making. Bluntly, it amounts to just dropping the matter. The justification will be a new majority and saving lives and money wrongly committed a lame-duck President and a previous plurality. In local terms the argument might hold water – which is why the voter endorsed it. However, even majorities that can determine policies to cope with the facts, do not have the power to change these facts. The earth can be proclaimed to be flat but it cannot be made into a real tortilla by majorities. The somnambulant average person, once awakened by the jolt of bad news can think what he wishes. Regardless of the twitch, the consequences of the “people’s decision” could prove to be more damaging than the price of an orderly retreat would have been. Accordingly, the conclusion here is that, ultimately, more lives might be lost in a crisis to come by humbling Bush by “running,” than staying on a consequent course of extrication would have been. Let this essay be concluded by explaining some of the reasoning behind the disturbing allegation.

Armies are the most effective when they preclude the need to use them. Power that prevents conflicts is of a higher value than might that must prove itself. Credibility, predictability and reliability are key components of the protection of the national interest. Viewed from here, the USA appears to lack not resources but the resolute will to apply her means when the going gets tough. America’s foreign policy operates from a basis that is as solid as whipped cream is. If following through demands time, sacrifices and the acceptance of tactical reverses, then the policy is prone to be changed. The problem is that the uninformed mass and the political class responsible for retreats will domestically be able to avoid the impression that the “correction” is a defeat. The US’ foes and those contemplating to oppose her, however, will be fully aware of the rout. In fact this is potentially the weakness of their position. Their skewed perception is that the US has been vanquished because of innate weakness. It escapes them that some American reverses are rooted in her provincially induced willingness to let happen what could be avoided abroad for “it does not really matter”. The resulting disrespect and the belittling of the States’ potential had led to several misjudgments in the past century (Imperial Germany, the Third Reich, Tokyo in 1941). America overcame with little damage to her core these challenges which she would not necessarily have faced had she been taken seriously. Possibly, past success achieved regardless of an initial cold start contributes to future threats. What these cases of mismanagement, under-reaction, unclear positions and unpreparedness suggest is that America can afford to be negligent even in matters that threaten her existence. Like Westerns, myopic American mythology assumes that the good guys prevail against those wearing black hats. Well, history’s dominant theme is that the Bad Guys win.

Once again, the US’ foreign policy is in danger of being put together by a combination of an idealized image of the outside world and a confidence that errors can easily be corrected later. The impression of invulnerability and of scoring in the second half might correspond to historical experience but it is hardly supported by the emerging parameters of the current and future threat by rogue states, terrorism and rising powers. In this situation the appearance of weakness is, in itself, a failing. Weakness that is greater than what the limits of finite national power predetermines, is a political sin. Remember, that sin is generally followed by chastisement.

America’s problem created by her foreign policy’s provincialism is expressed by the elections. The matter is complex enough to attempt a summary. As in Viet Nam, the US’ enthusiasm and support of noble causes has proven to be fed by straw fire. Already the signs of the impending withdrawal are egging on the foes. “Going home” while seeking “better understanding” will not convince the Iranians and North Koreans that America needs not to be feared for she is not intent to subjugate them and the world. They will sense a vacuum and will try to do more than just to fill it. The result will be more intransigence and not a preparedness to negotiate a compromise. Bone-breaking action against states supporting terrorism will be – while terrorism is likely to thrive – improbable given the likely interpretation of the vote.  Abandoning Iraq – not the fact of terminating the experiment but the circumstances behind the withdrawal – will confirm the impression. With the risks ebbing there might be more terrorism and it will have a higher intensity.

Transatlantic relations will also suffer. Many of those here, who castigated Bush and whatever errors one might have attributed to the Iraq policy, have never really meant the policy and Bush the person. Their fundamental hostility was toward the real enemy, the US and nearly everything she in fact or imagination stands for. Bush and Iraq were only the sack beaten when the donkey was meant. The Cold War victory over Socialist states is still not forgiven. Certainly, in Europe some countries are friendly to America. Much of the positive sentiment is related to the security of the US umbrella. (Western Europe does not care about security as its public prefers not to take post-Soviet challenges seriously.) Giving up a position without good reason –there are valid reasons for leaving Iraq, too – simply because the price and the effort are taxing does not make a reassuring impression.

Initially a European honeymoon with the new makers of American policy is to be expected. However, it will not signal “peace,” only a pause to last until the US is again forced to stand up in the defense of her and the modern world’s interests. Since Kim and Ahmadinedjad going nuclear is accelerated by the coming softness of US foreign policy, the ripening of their projects will not allot Washington and the world much time. The crisis lurking offshore is gathering energy and so the period of calm granted is likely to be of limited duration.