Western failures behind apparent success. The wisdom of the advocates of surrender. Switzerland‘s reputation and the ambitions of a show-horse Foreign Minister. When the mediator is a party to the dispute. The past we used to have and the new past we are getting. Is Peking talking to Tibet or is it just emitting noise to confuse? George Handlery on the week that was.
 
1. The freeing of Ingrid Betancourt by Columbian commandoes is good news. The bad news is the implications that keep emerging regarding the will and the ability to defend civilization against its enemies. Much of this edition of “Duly Noted” will be dedicated to the Columbian and Tibet aspects of this problem.
 
2. The news coverage of the event in Columbia reveals a fundamental weakness of the  West. As a captive, Betancourt became a symbol. In that capacity she damaged the self-enamored, Marxist FARC. It is a part of the picture, which should not be blotted out that Betancourt was kidnapped while running against the “extremist” Uribe. Besides the implied judgment, she was also wrong about her assessment of the insurgents. Led by a typical misjudgment of leftist terrorists, Betancourt walked into a predictable trap. Thereafter, her helpers continued the pattern of being wrong about the facts of life. Her children – to be praised for clever, effective but misdirected activism in behalf of their mother – and the French government’s efforts joined to pressure mainly Uribe. He was to secure the release of Betancourt by paying the price to be set by the narco-rebels. The result of this “realism” would have been a major victory for the jungle Marxist and major damage to Columbia. Uribe remained undaunted. As a result, all interests involved were served to a maximal extent.
 
3. Columbia’s democratically elected government resisted the pressure to make concessions to terrorists. The nudge to “be realistic” and to give in came from two sources. (1) Some advocates of surrender represented the wisdom of friends such as France. Proudly she still takes credit for having prevented liberation by force. The Foreign Minister must sense the problem. Thus, Kouchner opined that the successful operation is not a “defeat” of those who had advocated conciliation. Those “others” were NGO’s and “neutrals.” (2) Hostile neighbors desiring Uribe’s bankruptcy, most notably Chavez and Corea, used “negotiations” to complement politically what their physical support of ideologically allied guerrillas was attempting to achieve. Between these two categories are Washington’s measures. There a major party foolishly dislikes Uribe more than it might sensibly doubt the FARC. America’s resulting paralysis held back much what would have aided Columbia.
 
4. A special and surprising case looms hidden behind the façade. Properly and successfully, Switzerland has historically justified her neutrality by using her status to facilitate conflict resolution. (Briefly, the Swiss concept of neutrality included clearly stated obligations. One: the ability to defend militarily the country‘s integrity. Two, to use her neutrality to perform services mediating in the interest of the world community.) This role required strict neutrality and much discretion while acting as the go between hostile parties. Alas in the Betancourt case evidence is propping up that is to the country’s and to global diplomacy’s disadvantage. Switzerland’s ability to serve the international community is being jeopardized by her own government. More exactly, the culprit is not the Federal Council (cabinet) but the loose gun, the ear-to-ear smiling Councilor (minister) of Foreign Affairs, Ms Calmy-Rey. Moved by a combination of naiveté and the shibboleths of leftist ideology, the good lady (the gender deserves mention as when criticized she likes to hide behind it) is willing to discard a centuries old tradition that had served this unusual country terribly well. Wherever you live, you will have no trouble finding comparable cases suggesting that ideology is allowed to take precedence over the facts.
 
5. The story with Swiss particulars continues. Take the case of her mediator in Columbia. Professor Jean-Pierre Gontard is acting in the service of the eccentric leftist “show horse” Foreign Minister who sympathizes with the rebels. After Betancourt’s liberation, Calmy-Rey promptly thanked herself for her engagement. Polite Uribe also called to do the same. Regardless of this, even the foreign office admitted that, the release of the hostages had nothing to do with CR’s mediation. Meanwhile a certain Lucas Gualdron is allowed to run from Lausanne the FARC’s European HQ. A local weekly is made to wonder about the intense contacts between this Gualdron and the Swiss mediator in Columbia. While the foregoing was being edited, the suspected foul is gaining substance. It is being reported that secret FARC documents retrieved by a Columbian raid, reveal that Ms CR’s “mediator” had acted as a currier delivering money to the terrorists.
 
6. Can it be a surprise that, after evaluating the data, Bogotá has (July 8) announced its intent in the future not to make use of either Swiss or French mediation in confronting the Communist insurgency? The not-so-hard-to-guess reason: Columbia does not trust the “neutral” mediators who had worked for the “other side”.
 
7. New developments emerging make the topic “Columbia” and its bifurcations appear to be under a special curse. Or so it seems to someone who attempts to complete an up-to-date manuscript on the matter. A growing number of unexpected skeletons stumble out of closets that had not been detected previously. The newest (July 10) is that Gontard’s recall has been repeatedly requested by the Columbians. Ms Calmy-Rey’s Ministry refused to comply. Spicy details about the Professor’s unusual status emerge. First, Columbia is, unlike comparable cases, the special file of Ms CR. Second, Gontard is employed under different terms than the 20 other mediators. The Ministry’s bureaucracy is not communicative regarding the reasons. Meanwhile Columbia, too, wants the Swiss to explain such oddities. It appears that Mr Gontard is sort of a double agent. Oh, not of Swiss democracy and of the Red guerillas. Much rather he served a personalized Swiss Foreign Office and the Marxist insurgency, while as a nominally neutral mediator he impersonated before a duped international community the honest broker.
 
8. The general management of the crisis teaches lessons. Capitulation is easy but its consequences are hard. Submission allows the momentary retention of a bit of what one rightfully had. It also implies that in the next round more will be asked and less granted in exchange. After a few reruns of this, the option of resistance will diminish and its chances of succeeding will sink to near zero on the gage. In the history we used to have those who understood that the path suggested by cowardice is the most perilous of them all, were feted. In the new past we are getting, with clearly meant implications for the present, the vilified Churchills, Adenauers, and Trumans are made responsible for conflicts with the aggressor of their time. It is claimed that these were brought about by their stubbornness and lack or realism.
 
9. Peking is discussing but not negotiating the case of Tibet with the Lama’s representatives. In itself, this is a good sign. However, China insists on the “one China principle” which is odd as it is not questioned by the Tibetans. The emphasis on the matter bodes trouble for Taiwan in an imaginable attempt to regularize its relationship with the PRC. Regarding Tibet, China tries to place the Tibetans into an extreme position they do not care to take. Presumably, the purpose is to justify for home consumption a continued hard-line policy. If implemented, the central theme will be “guilt by separatism.” The unity of China is powerful medicine. It is an issue on which, since the 20s, even the Kuomintang and the Reds agreed.
 
10. Apparently Peking’s purpose in the talks does not give priority to the settlement which both parties could easily achieve while also keeping what they must have. This deal would be that, Tibet acknowledges anew that it is a Chinese province. In exchange, the region would receive in practice the theoretically existing cultural autonomy of the indigenous. In seeking a bargain the Tibetan side wants very little, as it is demanding reservation status. Tibet could ask for much more than it does and China could give a lot more than the pittance from which she recoils. On this basis Tibet is an easier-to-solve ethnic problem that those of the Balkans, central and eastern Europe. The asymmetry of the relationship has two aspects. One is that the Tibetan side is forced to reaffirm repeatedly China’s sovereignty. Meanwhile, the principle of local autonomy is placed by Peking near the phrase “separatism” whose official connotation is “criminal”. Second, while the coming Olympics are the best of the Lama‘s bad cards, he is asked to show loyalty by preventing all discord during the games and to refrain from all the “criminal activity” he has not committed. The implication is a “have you stopped beating your wife” situation. Moreover, through such formulations, all future demands for Tibet’s cultural identity can be smeared as being separatist so as to prove that they are “criminal”. With this, we are back at the starting point: how seriously does Peking wish an agreement with a party that is eager to settle at almost any terms? Peking talks with the Lama but it skirts the concrete issues that could be settled. This is not “talk”, it is not a dialogue, it is merely politically useful “noise”. Its purpose is to help to make the world that wishes for an excuse to do so, forget.
 
11. Could it be that the problem contained in negotiations is for Peking is that it must come up with a unique proposal? Superficially, for the casual observer it should appear to be reasonable while the substance is to be dismal enough to make the Tibet-side reject it.