Duly Noted: Better to Be the “Plucker” than the “Pluckee.”

From the desk of George Handlery on Sat, 2008-08-30 07:09

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George Handlery about the week that was. Elections are not about quotas. Violating agreements. Expand Nato? More “dialogue” instead of action or security by joining the gang? Real weapons to protect against real foes. EU centralization and its fans. Foreign policy hopes and practical reality.
 
1. Investors, beware! Russia’s rulers violate her financial and political agreements. For details contact BP, Georgia – more of the gullible to follow.
 
2. The consequences of the crushing of Georgia are still undergoing assessment. Clearly, the comfy luxury of no substantive reaction is one of the most consequential and risky one among the imaginable scenarios. Prior to the crisis, NATO decided not to act on the Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership. The motive was to spare Russia the supposedly provocative impression that she is being encircled. Looking into the future, the reasons for membership have gained in weight. So did the argument of those who will again plead to reject Georgia’s candidacy – with implications for the Ukraine. The argument for keeping Tbilisi out is that Georgia’s dowry includes an existing quarrel with Russia while her sovereignty is, as things are, curtailed by her ex-overlord.
 
3. Pulling Georgia under NATO’s umbrella has also points in its favor. These are the product of Russia’s excesses in responding to Saakashvili’s original mistake. This error was that he was unprepared to grant Ossetia the independence from Georgia that he rightly demands from Russia for his own land. Georgia needs protection as her situation is difficult due to her location, size, past status and reduced sovereignty. Still, at the time of the 1949 funding of the Alliance only its North American members were relatively “safe.” The worse possible signal to Moscow would be to reject a country subjected to Russian pressure. In this case the sequel will be Kremlin action to have small exposed states (the Baltics?) be dropped by the alliance to pacify Russia in Munich-style. In addition, not accepting Georgia now amounts to an indirect acceptance of Russia’s right to a “cordon sanitaire” in regions that she used to dominate – or wished to control.
 
4. There is a need to respond to Russia’s domineering move in the Caucasus. The preferred answer could follow the fault line separating the alliance’s new eastern members from its original Western components. Among the premises of the positions expected, we will find complex interacting bundles of considerations. Direct experience with Soviet domination will be important to explain who will prefer what. The sense of feeling directly threatened is likely to play an important role in shaping attitudes. Add to this that  “old Europe” has lived and prospered undisturbed while under the protection of the westernmost member of the alliance. “New Europe” will be asking from these countries something they got used to not having to do even in their own behalf. It amounts to risk standing in the rain and to give up their shelter in order to protect Europe’s center and east.
 
5. The possible reactions to the example and lesson provided by the Kremlin for the world’s benefit in Georgia are three. 1. Stand around in torpor and hope that Russia “grows up.” 2. Avoid further confrontations and humiliation by preparing for it. 3. Prepare for worse case scenarios by seeking Russia’s protection by joining the gang. Expect a number of the pariahs of world politics that need affiliations to exploit this opportunity.
 
6. For one thing, Russia (the case also fits China) despises the sanctimoniousness of the West. At the same time Russia also covets the West’s recognition of her as an equal. However, this recognition, if extended, is an expression of the pharisaic inclination of the West. To say the least, this circumstance greatly reduces the value of the equality that might be formally granted. If forthcoming, Western acceptance will not be an expression of Russia‘s economic or democratic-political performance. Much rather it will be a concession in response to Russia‘s demonstration that she pursues her historic goals with the old and proven brutally if need be.
 
7. The Georgian calamity leaves us with several insights. 1. Events have confirmed the paramount importance of the declining, and by its chief beneficiaries abused and neglected, transatlantic alliance. 2. Protecting Russian minorities in the “near abroad” might be used as an excuse by Moscow to intervene in countries harboring populations that can be declared to be Russian. 3a. The small countries on Russia’s periphery can and must do more for their own defense. 3b. The tools of defense in this zone presupposes an inventory of classical weapons that are neglected by the emphasis on asymmetric warfare. These are rockets to fight armored divisions and missiles effective against advanced aircraft. Providing such weapons will expose their supplier to Moscow’s massive pressure. The Kremlin will declare the delivery of such equipment to amount to a hostile act.
 
8. It appears that, in certain quarters, a debate fed by set-aside-mindedness is taking place. The “allocators” of justice ply their trade on the basis of quota placement earned by born-with traits. Some uncertainty prevails among our “guides” whether now a “woman’s” or a “Black man’s” election has the “correct” priority. Here a really radical idea: the purpose of an election is to select the best person to fit the office.
 
9. Liberal and internationalist America hopes that Obama’s election will make it and the country well-liked. Caution is warranted. Indeed, many America-haters curse Bush because that is more PC than mentioning the country that elected him. Under Obama, the camouflage will fade. That will be as soon as the US does not adopt a policy of retreat and of “change-of-side” the country cannot afford and Obama is unlikely to support. Note that, with the choice of the Vice President, the candidate of change had intended to signal that continuity will play a role in his foreign policy.
 
10. A new era with more than a usual number of confrontations (Iran, China, Russia, Venezuela, and global Jihad) is ahead of us. How crisis-proof an American candidate for the Presidency might be is, therefore, a matter to ponder. Obama might have the ability to prevent a spat from growing into a crisis by bending as needed. He also shows the promise of getting out of a disagreement by his willingness to “lose feathers for peace.” In some cases, depending on the adversary, either approach might serve the country and those sharing its way of life, adequately. There are, however, challenges that need to be met resolutely. In this case the firm “no” must believed because of previous performance and the personal record of the President. This is the situation in which Obama is likely to do badly. You cannot get yourself out of a quarrel in which the other side seeks your great capitulation by going through a series of little surrenders. (N.B. Regarding “losing feathers:” it is better to be the “plucker” than the “pluckee.”)
 
11. Theoretically, there might be instances in which dozes of calculated appeasements might convince extremists to modify their goals and to revise the use of their means. This is guaranteed not to work if the fanatics have an ideology that declares the enemy cowardly, weak and predestined to submit. If this is the case, patient moderation and the attempt to reason is interpreted as the proof of the correctness of what their world-view says about the enemy. The logical result is heightened extremism and confirmed contempt. (P. S. North Korea’s inerrupted disassembly of her decrepit reactor anticipates the outcome of the US’ elections. This makes it a concrete case that supports the generalization.)
 
12. Can one be a good person, a good European and an opponent the EU? The answer depends partly on how these terms are defined. Mainly, however, it depends on what the EU set out to be and what it is now and, furthermore, what its movers – not its citizens – wish it to become. As implied, the writer sees in the EU an organization created to protect the independence of the region’s small states and even more its multitude of peoples. From what? From the forces of centralization. These desire to impose their own order by obstructing those forms of existence that history has created.
 
13. The EU, as defined by “Brussels,” is the project of those who are frustrated because the dull masses are reluctant to follow them. An added attraction of the vision is that Brussels gives away jobs that pay well and confer bureaucratic power upon those who could not get it from their people.
 
14. One more thing! The show in Denver is over. One has to pull one’s hat to acknowledge the dazzling fireworks produced there. However, fireworks dim as quickly as they burst. It is the less glamorous search light that can cut through the night. Significantly, Denver has failed to leave us with a beacon.

A first time for everything # 3

Submitted by Atlanticist911 on Wed, 2008-09-03 23:57.

@ marcfrans

I agree with your analysis of the Hanson article, and I think we both know that I didn't really "agree" with kappert, which is why I placed that question mark at the end of my subject header.

A first time for everything # 2

Submitted by marcfrans on Wed, 2008-09-03 23:34.

@ Atlanticist

It is dangerous to simply "agree" with K.  Because such 'agreement' hides very different motivations.   

My reading of Hanson is NOT that he is "calling for the abolition of NATO".  Rather, he seems to be observing or accepting that it is failing and that its credibility is dissolving.  

From a US perspective, there seems little that could be gained from a formal abolition of NATO now.  It could in some situations still be of some use.  It also provides some vehicle for transatlantic 'exchange' and, perhaps, can be useful to a sensible segment of Europe's political class in their internal-European struggles with their (more?) numerous naive-lefties of the Steinmeier (and our own K) type.

I think that Hanson's main purpose is to tell Americans that they should revisit and revise their own attitudes towards NATO.  He thinks that they should start treating it like the major European states have been treating it for some years now, i.e. not as a serious commitment or obligation, but more like a self-serving tool when it suits them, and to be ignored when they think it doesn't.  Basically, I suspect that Hanson wants to limit (or stop) any further technology transfers to fickle 'allies' and to reduce the economic burden on the USA.   But, then, a renewed period of long-term American isolationism (relatively speaking) seems unavoidable in the current state of the culture.  Americans have 'feelings' too, and they do not appreciate manifest ingratitude and selfishness. .    

As to our friend K, he doesn't know yet the wisdom of the old saying "be careful what you wish for, because you may well get it".         

@ Pankukas

Don't you think that the Poles know very well that, when the chips are down, their security does not really depend on Nato, and even less on Germany or the EU, but on their agreement with the US? One must assume that they are not yet in a position where they can afford to forget major lessons of history.

Theoretically, from a national security standpunt, I disagree that an "alliance of the unwilling is worse than none".  Such an alliance is still marginally better, PROVIDED one is fully aware of the true nature of the (dis)'alliance'.  However, viewed from a practical standpoint, perhaps you are right?  Because, we know that in wealthy and free Western societies, a sizable segment of the public and the political class tends to cling to naive-left illusions, so that the above PROVISO may not be realised.  If there is no proper recognition (think Obama!!) of the true nature of the state of the alliance (which ultimately must rest on the state of public opinion in the major members), then an alliance of the unwilling may be more dangerous than none.     

@MarcFrans

Submitted by Pankukas on Thu, 2008-09-04 09:41.

Sure, there still are important benefits and "uses" to politically weakened NATO: infrastructure, training, joint exercises, experience from joint missions. I'd say: the bigger the fish, the more uses; the further from the potential sources of instability, the easier it is to stomach political risks and uncertainties. It's dicey if one is so dependant on the alliance for security as Latvia is (and Estonia, Lithuania, too, I think).

The most significant asset Baltic countries contribute to NATO is probably BALTNET - an air surveillance network some in Russia have even called "Pentagon's eyes on Russia'". :) There are limited resources that can be spent on defence, and they get spent on building infrastructure vital to receive NATO troops, participation in the missions in KFOR, ISAF, previously OIF, as well as niche capabilities where Latvia can contribute like de-mining, explosive ordnance disposal. Just one example to illustrate: participation in NATO missions this year alone costs more than MoD concept proposes to spend on the same SPIKE missile over 3 years; participation in NATO Strategic Airlift Capability iniciative costs per year about the same as SPIKE.

"Conventional wisdom" says: Latvia has absolutely nothing to seek or gain in Iraq, Afghanistan or Kosovo; anti-aircraft and anti-armor systems are more important than de-mining. The way you can rationalise and justify this set of priorities is: we help NATO missions wherever they are, in whatever fashion we can, in exchange for that promise of protection (against Russia, of course) in case we need it. Strategic airlift is vital for "expeditionary stance", it does of course contribute to Latvia's security, so long as promise of protection is not in doubt. And so on... If that promise is in doubt, the pacifists and "we will always have to try surviving next to Russia and must therefore become its vasal - (something similar to Belarus, or better variant like Finlandization)" crowd's arguments start cutting to the core…

Finland

Submitted by mdavid on Thu, 2008-09-04 11:39.

In my country they said Finland wants to become a NATO member. Caucasus' conflict has strange consequences.

Russia and the abolition of NATO

Submitted by mdavid on Thu, 2008-09-04 13:48.

The split inside Europe in "pragmatists", etc is connected with position towards Russia only.
And only with gas imports. It was caused only by Western states when they rushed to Moscow; Berlusconi was among the first . And in doing so, they sabotaged the very Nabucco project which was initiated by themselves. Should I understand this was because this stupid anti-Americanism demands to reject the US variant of Caspian gas ? only to get rid of US in any kind ? I hope not.

The 40% share of EU gas imports from Russia from all EU needs will not contradict EU goal of cutting emissions ? Leaving nuclear/coal for gas does not also contradict this goal ?

If the emissions are going to be cut, Russia will intervene not to hinder the cash flow which gets in to the country. They will send the military to WE to keep their economies running.

And if they want full success all they need is to rebrand the Russian Army as Red Army again and the westerners will feel gratitude towards these peacefull and nice soldiers. They also can bring into power some kind of a Communist Party; Miliband and his colleagues from the West will be extremely happy. The actual hymn is USSR's hymn. Why not recreate USSR in a formal way ? In fact Putin said USSR's collapse was the greatest "geopolitical" disaster of XX century. Remember: geopolitical, not ideological. Putin's only ideology is Cekism, not communism.
So, they don't need a real Communist Party; to atract the western nostalgics they can pretend USSR is back. And for the real bussiness: geopolitics only, without any real ideology.
In this way they will recreate the (geopolitical)USSR and its former sphere of influence without firing a shot. And with total support from a half of Western public and politicians.
May the gods help us Russians will not figure out how to "implement" this "plan" !

Russia and the abolition of NATO - final

Submitted by mdavid on Thu, 2008-09-04 18:04.

And it is about gas only. This is because our western partners like to live according to high principles while letting aside all the insignificant details: the daily life, that is; heating, economy ? Oh, somebody will take care for us; we are busy creating plans, elaborating high principles and having meaningful discussions about them; and having a lot of fun.
And energy - to have this life and this enourmous and varied fun ? These bloodsucking capitalists will do it for us; we have better things to do.
And so, they go busy saving the world without... asking the world if she wants to be saved the way they offer. So, for the this gas they are ready to use the high principles: to kiss Russia's behind. Hard to live by these principles if one neglects the "degrading" details of achieving this life style.

And all of these because West never knows how to behave in relation with Russia.
During Ieltsin years the West did not help too much this country with smart plans or willing to come close to that country - they let her to manage alone; instead, when the Russians wanted to open the archives, entire West - US included - jumped in an instant threateaning Russia not to do it: why ? because they did not want the world to know the exact amount of western politicians - people full of principles - who colaborated willingly with KGB and GRU: tens of thoudands, hundreds of thousands ?
Or the exact number of decades: 2,3,4 ? And the money involved ? Even the mental retards in the East knew all these details.

Now today's Russia achieved its goal: splitting EU in 4...not in two. France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Greece, Belgium, Luxembourg, etc are friends of Russia; good friends, that is.
But is this a real friendship or is it forced upon them ?

And UK is totally against Russia; another smart stance: because UK is a big player, isn't it ?

Re: Finland

Submitted by Pankukas on Thu, 2008-09-04 12:58.

I have only seen that Finland has in principle agreed to give up on anti-personnel mines (while looking what is the fuss about Georgian cluster munitions). The cluster munition ban thing seems like another madness when faced with prospect of trying to stop massive armor concentrations - HRW claims that the convention outlaws 99% of existing stockpiles. Will Soros financed activists and the like turn up to lie down in front of them or what, I wonder...

@Vasarahammer: maybe you are aware what Finland intends as replacement for mines?

Finland not to become a NATO member

Submitted by Vasarahammer on Thu, 2008-09-04 12:29.

"
In my country they said Finland wants to become a NATO member. Caucasus' conflict has strange consequences.
"

Where did you hear this?

Finland will not join NATO as long as the leftist Tarja Halonen remains as president. She will make sure that no conclusions are drawn from the conflict and that her head will remain squarely in the sand.

Foreign minister Alexander Stubb blurted out his pro-NATO stance, but he received little support from anyone else in government.

@Vasarahammer

Submitted by mdavid on Thu, 2008-09-04 13:30.

They mentioned only this news - in my country -: "Finland wants ...NATO" , without giving any further details.

But: it was during a political talk show; the news bulletins did not mention anything. It was probably what you said: Stubb said something and they made it bigger than it actually was.

I don't think I want to know what a leftist western gov. says about this conflict; in my country they thrashed Saak., but every detail regarding Russia's actions was also presented; including the strategical ones.

Stalin gets a makeover in Moscow

Submitted by Atlanticist911 on Wed, 2008-09-03 22:41.

Quote from Daily Mail (September 3).

 

Stalin acted 'entirely rationally' in executing and imprisoning millions in Gulags, a controversial Russian teaching manual claims...

 

The manual, A History of Russia 1900-1945, will form the basis of a state-approved text book for use in Russian schools next year.

 

It follows moves from prime minister Vladimir Putin to re evaluate Stalin's record in a more positive light...

 

The manual suggests Stalin acted 'entirely rationally  - as the guardian of a system, as a consistent supporter of reshaping the country into an industrialised state'.  

 

Editor Alexander Danilov said: "We are not defending Stalin. We are just exploring his personality, explaining his motives and showing what he really achieved".

 

Alexander Kamensky, of the Russia State University for the Humanities, said the manual was a sign that teaching history in schools has become 'an ideological instrument'.

 

  

 

   

re: farewell NATO

Submitted by Pankukas on Wed, 2008-09-03 19:20.

If the US does not withdraw from NATO "precipitously" -- meaning, the Germany based (see page 23, under Strategic Theater Transformation) Stryker Brigade Combat Team and 2 Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (scheduled to be in Germany till 2012.-2013, then to redeploy to USA), redeploy instead to Poland and/or nearer to ME/Caucasus (but still in Europe like Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria) -- I'd rather agree than disagree.

Maybe it would have the beneficial effects VDH writes about, maybe not. Alliance of unwilling is worse than none, and US commitment to Poland ("with or without NATO") sounds much better than uncertainty and prospect of possibly month long diplomatic struggle to deploy something, while the member state urgently needs assistance... If no other good comes out of it, at least the politicians in Latvia would cease endlessly reiterating "Article 5 this, Article 5 that", and maybe will concentrate on rearing that "porcupine" instead. ;)

European plugs

Submitted by kappert on Wed, 2008-09-03 16:06.

It is very illuminating, that the 'European voice' is split in 'trojan horses', 'strategic partners', 'friendly pragmatists', 'frosty pragmatists', and 'new cold-warriors'. Given the 'asymmetric interdependence', I call for an abolition of NATO, as there exists no counterpart.

@ Akira

Submitted by traveller on Tue, 2008-09-02 08:44.

I knew you were going to come to that.
Of course you forgot quite a few names, amongst them the most important, in your list.
You are really unbelievable, Czarist Russia was the original model for Lenin's powerbase and is now translated in the modern version by Putin.
The powergrabbing and empire building is exactly the same.

USSR <---> Russia

Submitted by Pankukas on Tue, 2008-09-02 10:01.

Akira's claim to FACTS: "(a) Russia is not the USSR"

And that, too, is a tired platitude repeated by Russians "generously" wanting to share the Soviet criminal and barbaric "inheritance". Reading EN Wikipedia is enough to verify that Soviet Russia (or Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic) was a successor of tsarist Russia, and was subsequently succeeded by USSR. Republic of Latvia, for example, made peace (Treaty of Riga, August 11, 1920, French translation here) with Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic - not USSR, which did not exist at the time.

Rest of the comment consists of ramblings not meriting response.

germany and Russia

Submitted by mdavid on Tue, 2008-09-02 12:50.

Yesterday, during a political show on a TV news channel, a guy close to german political environment - he knows germany for thirty years - said the following:

1. the german blogosphere during Georgia conflict expressed satisfaction to the fact Russia is back and is defeating US: you (US) will see what Ivan will do to you, etc.

2.during NATO summit in Bucharest, Berlusconi kept tight contact with Putin, informing about everything happened there.

3. recently - 1-2 day ago -, Lavrov delivered a speech at a diplomatic institute in Moscow - the guy said this is the best in the world; he's probably right -, telling students there it is time Russia has her sphere of influence.

When did the germans become so full of hatred and resentment, so they support antigerman positions in such numbers ? The "suden" closure
of the gas supply - towards Germany and Poland -for technical reasons don't tell them anything ?

Or the germans want to live in some kind of utopia without taking care of the nonimportant aspects of life, like heat or the displeasent/disagreeable details of economy ?

The closure of nuclear power plants in germany does not appear now as a job done by fools - as it was then, when it was decided - ? What the ecologists/german Greeanpeace say about that ?

I see WE wants to save the world first and only that; let's see who will save them from not having gas.

I don't know for which audience writes Mr.Handlery: germany is not part of it.

re: Germany and Russia

Submitted by Pankukas on Tue, 2008-09-02 14:01.

I don't think it's fair or helpful to single out Germans for their "unsustainable" policy towards Russia. No idea about the respective blogospheres, but wanting "to live in some kind of utopia" IMO applies equally to French and Italian (nominally conservative) politicians and businesses as well as whole lot of other EU countries (those not characterised as "heavyweights"). Even the suspension of EU-Russia partnership talks plays out just fine with them, because sphere of "energy security and supply" was to be one of priorities. With EU sidelined, individual member states remain free to pursue their own bilateral agreements, which thus far seem to be guided mainly by one consideration only - namely, greed.

Pessimistic summary: short of having Russian tanks back in close vicinity of their own borders, I don't know what could force EU "heavyweights" to significantly alter their policies towards Russia.

@Pankukas

Submitted by mdavid on Wed, 2008-09-03 00:15.

Remember I mentioned Italy; also the same guy said Spain falls in the same category; he said Spain will "sell her mother". I hope it's not true. The bilateral arrangements are already in place, Pankukas: France and Italy were the first to walk this way. Germany has also a close partnership; if SPD wins, the connections will be even stronger. I wonder why they say there is something called EU.

@mdavid

Submitted by Pankukas on Wed, 2008-09-03 09:31.

Yes, basically, lots of the deals were there, yet there is plenty of space for "broadening" and "deepening". And, overall reduction of Russia's share in EU gas imports over last 5 years notwithstanding, the "bad example" of bilateral deals is contagious. For all the hawkish political stance of, say, Latvia, internally there is ongoing political tussle about further "gazpromisation" of the the country - whether to build gas fired heating/electricity plant, or to opt for a coal fired one.

"Gazpromisation" does not affect political position of the country (yet), and Latvia has control over important asset - Incukalns gas storage facility (source of deliveries back into Russia during winter), but watching how the Western-Europeans cut the deals with Russia here and there greatly undermines position of those arguing for cutting reliance on Russian gas wherever possible. Latvian gas distributor is jointly owned by Russian Gazprom+Itera - 50% and Germany's E.ON Ruhrgas... And then there are EU's "environmental concerns" and emission quotas - another factor, which in the end works in favour of "gazpromisation". It's a bad situation and getting worse.

I'm not sure if much of anything would change in terms of energy policy if SPD gets more power in Germany. Has anything changed when CDU/CSU became "senior partner" in coalition? It's "rainbow coalition" now, it's likely to stay the same, I think.

________
Other stuff: US envoy calls on NATO to beef up defenses in Baltic

Will he be listened to, or met with 'let's not "provoke" bear' arguments?

I'm not sure about Estonia and Lithuania, but was pleasantly surprised that Latvia (traditionally the "weakest link") seems to have quietly started to acquire at least some of hardware suitable for "porcupine" suggested by Fred Kagan. Nothing that could be "show stopper" or even "delayer" at this moment, but Israeli/Euro Spike ATGM is a capable weapon. No details beyond than the first batch of operators cum instructors has finished training program and MoD concept proposes spending about EUR 12.2 mil on this weapon over 3 years.

@Pankukas

Submitted by mdavid on Wed, 2008-09-03 13:14.

"...in terms of energy policy": the guy did not reffer to energy policy, but to policy towards Russia as a whole; his example was about Georgian conflict: it was a moment when Merkel
toughened her position towards Ru.; at the same time the foreign minister - and future candidate for chancellor position - was against Merkel; he said this split is almost unheard of in Ger. If SPD wins, Germany will be more accommodating for everything Russia wants.
As you said, it's bad and going worse.

"Russia's share in overall EU gas imports" is going down: are you sure ?

"blogosphere" and "energy policy": it counts, because if you want to go nulear - at least for transition to other sources - you need the support of the public; german public takes strategic decisions with their liver or pancreas, brain excluded.

@mdavid

Submitted by Pankukas on Wed, 2008-09-03 15:11.

Merkel vs. Steinmeier:- yes, I agree; that is signal that wider political imlications of SPD win, in terms of overall German policy towards Russia, could be negative.

> "Russia's share in overall EU gas imports" is going down: are you sure ?"

I didn't doublecheck, but that information comes from recent ECFR paper on EU-Russia relations http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_eu_russia_publication/:

"Between 2000 and 2005, Russia’s share of EU gas imports declined from 50% to 40%, Russian gas represented only 25% of EU gas needs, while the Union accounted for 70% of Russia’s sales."

"blogosphere and energy policy" - I agree.

@Pankukas

Submitted by mdavid on Wed, 2008-09-03 17:54.

Well, this 25% is a problem: it is projected to reach 40% in x years - I don't remember the x, but it is under 20 (10 maybe ?).

It won't be a problem if Steinmeier is a pragmatic guy, but I don't think so.

@Akira

Submitted by dbostan on Mon, 2008-09-01 02:21.

Akira,

I am sorry to have to quote Lenin, but he had a good one for people like you: "useful idiot"...

New Warsaw Pact # 3

Submitted by marcfrans on Sun, 2008-08-31 22:46.

1) It is a safe bet that there are "gangster thugs" in every country, although there are certainly differences in numbers and proportions between countries.  An important consideration is, of course, whether such thugs are in charge of governments, or not.  Whatever may be the case, it is never justified to refer to a group of nationalities as "a bunch of thugs".  Such language suggests a lack of seriousness, and it reveals unadulterated prejudice.  

2) Whatever the respective numbers of thugs and the respective 'levels' of "corruption, drugs trafficking, etc...." in various countries, how could this in any way justify annexation of parts of a neigboring country by military force?

3) When a large army invades another country, one may safely assume that the direct decision was made by a government and not by many people (irrespective of whether they are 'thugs' or not).  Two relevant considerations are:

- What are the intentions of the 'aggressor' government?

- And, are these intentions widely shared by the people of that government?   

3)   There are indications that Putin's actions are popular in Russia.  This is not surprising, given that Russia has no longer 'free media', so that the public's worldview can easily be shaped and manipulated.  So, it is reasonable to assume that the Russian public is generally favorably disposed towards Putin's manifest clear goal of restoring the former 'soviet union' as much as possible, not in an economic sense (communism), but in a geographic and geopolitical sense.  And, it is also reasonable to assume that the Russian public does not care about the wishes of the peoples of the 'near abroad'.  At the same time, it is also reasonable to assume that the publics of Georgia, Ukraine, Baltics....overwhelmingly do not want to be re-annexed into the Russian empire, irrespective of whatever the levels of 'thuggery' are in various countries (including Russia).

So, one fails to see what the relevance could be of designating certain nationalities as "gangster thugs" in this context of the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

  

@Akira

Submitted by dbostan on Sun, 2008-08-31 19:25.

The East-Europeans do not want any war w. Russia.

But knowing full well how they behave, they have gone NATO.

Period, end of story. Nothing else.

New Warsaw Pact # 2

Submitted by marcfrans on Sun, 2008-08-31 19:20.

Someone who dismisses "Poles, Georgians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Hungarians, Rumanians etc..." as a "bunch of gangster thugs", obviously cannot be an objective observer of world events.  How then could anyone be surprised that Akira turns out to be an apologist for renewed Russian imperialism under the Putin oligarchy?

Russian logic

Submitted by jgillmartin on Sun, 2008-08-31 15:27.

As I read this post it occurred to me that the USA has the same problem with Mexico: upwards of 6 million American citizens living there; the Mexican government encourages immigrants and illegals to regain "stolen" lands, huge sums of American dollars prop up the nation; Mexico (the government; which is principally composed of the descendants of the Spanish aristocracy) "despises the sanctimoniousness" of the USA; corruption flows like milk on corn flakes, and flows both ways; and Americans and American politicos seem weary of sustaining the threads that tie the two together.

So, if I understand Russian logic, we should just go in and take everything from the border to Mexico City to protect our people from the persecution of the Mexican government and organized crime. After all it's our obligation to protect our people.

John @ The CRIB

"Soso the Russian"

Submitted by Pankukas on Mon, 2008-09-01 10:08.

It's kind of a relief that the most outspoken Russian apologists also happen to use bigoted language, and that they recycle the same stale arguments which Russians themselves have employed for over 17 years now.

To quote from Stalins biography by Edvard Radzinsky:

"The part of the town in which Beso's house stood was known as the Russian quarter, because Russian soldiers were stationed in a barracks nearby. So other children often called Soso "the Russian." This would lodge in his subconscious, with strange results. He would never feel the stirring of Georgian nationalist sentiment. Only his first revolutionary pseudonym--almost a childish nickname--had any connection with Georgia. As a professional revolutionary, he used only Russian names when living underground. He would later describe his homeland sarcastically as "that small area of Russia which calls itself Georgia."

Concentrating on alleged "minority" backgrounds of Russian Bolshevik leaders is poor attempt at deflection because:

- like Stalin, virtually all of them strived not to be like their kin; they tried to be Russian, to be like Russian, or to be "internationalist";
- they were subjects of Russian czar and/or became nationals of Soviet Russia (and not Poland, Latvia, Romania, etc.);
- last but not the least - just ask yourself why did it "just happen" that during Russian civil war Bolsheviks were decisively defeated in former territories of Russian empire - Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Bolsheviks defeated - but not in the Russia itself; peaceful and decent countries built in between the two world wars in all of those places - but not in the Russia itself.

History is history, but, when it comes to present, it isn't “Poles, Georgians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Hungarians, Romanians, etc.” who long for former Soviet glory - it is Russian president who deems demise of USSR "geopolitical catastrophe", and it isn't all the neighbours of Russia who have trouble dealing with criminal past of Soviet Union. Just ask yourself – why.

@ Akira

Submitted by traveller on Sun, 2008-08-31 09:01.

You forgot the Kursk.
Now you are saying that the Soviet Union was led by non-Russians, the next step will probably be that communism was non-Russian.
One little question, why then do the Russians want all those bad people as part of Russia again?
Mind you, I love Russia and the Russians but I hate what Putin is doing now to Russia, it's the same old crap all over again.

...

Submitted by Pankukas on Sat, 2008-08-30 12:47.

"3a. The small countries on Russia’s periphery can and must do more for their own defense."

Yes, but it is important to understand that development of armed forces of, for example, Baltic states follows something called "NATO Force Goals". As it stands currently, Latvia would be able to mount less resistance using convention army than Georgia. It is easy to dream that it should possess capability to decimate one Russian armored division before the country is occupied, but that is not only a mater of acquiring resources (and time, obviously), but the political will within NATO not to put "Russia considerations" before the security needs of Baltic as well.

The "Russia consideration" that RAND named as having contributed to accession of Baltic states to NATO:

- Putin "did not intend to make a major issue out of Baltic membership and that he wanted to concentrate on improving relations with NATO"; and
- that "defused the defensibility issue, making any aggressive Russian action or pressure against the Baltic states less likely";

is essentially reversed: Russia does not want to improve relations with NATO, defensibility issue is back in force. That may help Baltic states to get the necessary attention; whether or not there is unanimity within NATO member states not to let Russia dictate what and how is done for the defense of small countries on its border isn't clear at all.