He would be truly S-faced. "Let my Trabis go!"

How true.
 
ps:I bet this guy would look an even bigger prat with a trabant logo emblazoned across his mush*.  ;-)
 
http://hotair.com/archives/2007/09/16/photo-of-the-day-7/
 
 
*face.
 
 

The Anti-NATO Peace Pact: yet there will be some, motivated or blinded by factional passion, who will overlook the flaming hypocrisy of it. Remember "nuclear disarmament" (origin of the "peace" symbol) and "peaceful coexistence"? Again, the goal of leftists is not to create a just society but to destroy the societies they know.

Yup, yup - the Sarkozy-Medvedev-Merkel Pact. Though, for the time being one could bet that vanity and envy will make for overcrowded place for both Mr. Sarkozy and Ms. Merkel to be in there, and one of them will drop out :)

Just look how Deutsche Welle covered it: Sarkozy, Medvedev Call for New European Security Pact (not a word about how Sarko qualified his welcome - within existing structures and in consultation with US)

and how neutral FT did: Sarkozy welcomes Russia plan for security

The immorality of ANY Sarcozy's welcome to Russian "Helsinki II" proposal -- hardly a month since Russia wiped itself with a copy original Helsinki accords by trying to forcibly redraw borders in Europe -- should be lost on no one, however. Just as Germany's eagerness to get back to "business as usual" soonest possible: NATO-Russian Relations Still on Hold Despite Germany's Efforts

Get this. The Russian Prez, Dmitry Medvedev, wants an end to NATO. Instead, he wants a new European security pact that would be blatantly anti-American in character and based on the "inadmissibility of the use of force". If realised, this would surely be the first pacifists' military defence pact in the history of mankind?

Well, the message as to where some of the Western European governments see themselves (vis-à-vis NATO, so to speak) to me is loud and clear enough. As well as the fact that emergence of 'better governments' -- meaning, those not preoccupied with vain concerns like 'xyz-polarity', 'unrestrained' American power -- is, more often than not, difficult to imagine in near future. But one has to be at least partially 'out of one's mind' to seek satisfaction of 'multi-polarity' craving in increasingly authoritarian Russia...

@Kapitein Andre

The whole idea of Gazprom subsidizing prices rests on the notion that in Kyiv or Riga they must be similar to those in Berlin or Paris. That's no more correct or reasonable than to say that prices of BigMac or Ipod must be similar in all markets they are sold in -- otherwise they are "subsidized" in some places.

I'm sure most Latvians would be more than happy if Latvia were some kind of "Atlantis", capable of lifting off and then sea-landing somewhere in the vicinity of... *umm, let me think of some safe spot*... great state of Texas. Rather than "sitting astride" some "XYZ seas" or "long-standing interests" or whatever other rhetorical device is used to describe Russia's claims in the great game of "power projection". That a person with Western background would so readily entertain Russia's power claims under the guise of security interests while, simultaneously, directly or indirectly lamenting extension of NATO membership to Eastern European countries, leaves very odd feeling indeed.

1. Nearly all of the former Soviet republics receive subsidized gas from Gazprom, despite price increases. Nor is Belarus singled out, as Minsk and Gazprom have disputed gas prices and tariffs since 2007, and the latter has not been averse to reducing supplies in order to receive arrears.
 
2. Russia's security concerns are mainly logistical in nature. NATO sits astride the Barents, Baltic and Black Seas, and the US Navy can easily counter any Russian Navy presence in the Arctic or Pacific Oceans. In addition to the pre-Soviet desire for warm water ports, Russian airpower also faces a cordon sanitaire of NATO airspace, a crucial factor given its long-standing interest in Serbia. Lastly, American capabilities for power projection have increased at the expense of Russia's, at a time when both countries are competing for the natural resources of Central Asia, which borders Russia not the United States.

Says Puss: "You look so wondrous wise, I like your whiskers and bright black eyes:
Your house is the nicest house I see, I think there is room for you and me".
The mice were so pleased that they opened the door.
And Pussy soon laid them all dead on the floor.

 
Three mice went into a hole to spin,
Puss passed by and Puss looked in.
"What are you doing, my little men?"
"We're weaving coats for gentlemen".
"Please may I help you to wind up your thread?".
"Oh, no  Mistress Pussy, you'd bite off our heads".
 
[continued]

Whether you "believe" it, or not, Putin can present whatever "demand" that he wants, and anti-American Germans (like the rightist Kapitein Andre and the leftist Kappert) will be ready to 'justify' Putin's demand.  It has little or nothing to do with reason, and certainly not with morality.  It is based on cultivated hatred of America, pure and simple.   The neighbors of Russia will have to get used to that reality and understand that NATO (as presently conceived) has no long-term future. 

I know of no other country except Belarus, which still gets "subsidized" gas (price of gas for Ukraine depends on what Central Asian countries charge to Gazprom, I think).

NATO has abstained from deploying any significant forces in Baltic states; NATO countries have not sold to them any weapons which could conceivably be called "offensive"; it has not even drawn up any formal plans to defend them, in order not to "upset" Russia. I don't believe Russia can present demand that country like Latvia does not seek membership in any military alliance, does not plan and ready any infrastructure for deployment of troops by its allies in case its security is threatened, as some kind of legitimate "security interest".

The shades of belief (on climate change, missionary war, capitalism crash, etc.) in democracies depend as much on the person/character of the show biz as in any autocracy/dictatorship. People believed in Hitler, as they believed in Stalin or Bush or Putin. The modern America has no substance, only show. Glitz and mindless action are much more important than contemplation and planned movement. The U.S. still employ the Jackson-Venik Act to block most Russian imports and is importing essentially oil and petroleum products (does this have to do with a proclaimed 'moral basis'?). Europe has showed that they will not follow America into idiocy, with the as always exception of the lapdogs in London. To embargo Russia, or to protect against Russia (because of the Georgian attack on South Ossetia) is pure stupidity and vindictiveness. The enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and Georgia is pure illusion, just as illusionary as a 'victory' in Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, the military organisation stands between General Mark Carleton-Smith and General James Craddock. Shades of belief, I think.

1. In light of the relatively recent history of East-Central Europe, it is reasonable for the newly independent and democratic post-Communist and Soviet states to realign towards the West as well as to seek out security arrangements that will guarantee their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The question is which vehicle is appropriate. Initially, NATO was the only and ideal option.
 
2. Developments in Washington and Moscow during the Bush and Putin administrations, respectively, have made it crucial that Europe establishes its own collective security bloc - one that while perhaps retaining American 'guarantees' is not dominated by the United States or a vehicle for American foreign policy.
 
3. Moscow's position is that it is supplying former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states with subsidized gas, which is at below-market prices despite recent increases. If Russia is indeed using energy exports to project power, the importing countries have a clear choice - find alternatives.
 
4. Russia's primary security interest is American capabilities to project power into the post-Soviet space, including Russia. These capabilities have been expanding rapidly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The elements of this expansion include NATO expansion in East-Central Europe, 'color revolutions' in the Ukraine, Yugoslavia and Central Asia, and US/NATO deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan. Moscow regards these developments as being parallel to intensifying Russian, Chinese, American and European competition for Central Asian resources - esp. oil and gas. Central Asia is also of major concern to Moscow due to its history with and proximity to Russia, and the substantial Russian minorities there. While Washington claims that its foreign policy is driven by human rights and counter-terrorism concerns, both Moscow and Beijing see its actions in terms of competition for natural resources. Do Russian interests 'morally' supersede those of its neighbors? Of course not. But they cannot be easily dismissed as they have been.

1) States cannot "believe" anything, only human beings can believe something. In liberal democracies these beliefs will reveal many 'shades' and can be vigorously expressed.  In autocracies, the only beliefs that matter (not in a moral sense, but in a practical sense) are those of the regime or of the leader and, I repeat, they have nothing to do with 'rights'.  

Indeed, all states have "national rights", which is to say that the people of those states have such rights.  In the absence of internal democracy and under normal circumstances, the rulers' expressed beliefs about such rights can have no moral legitimacy.

2)  The Kapitein of ethnic racism sounds like a true radical leftist in his desire to undo history.  Boy, is he prejudiced against the British!  And his last sentence under item 2 is a boldfaced lie.  It is easy to understand why Obama gets cheered in Berlin these days.  Yet, Berliners and the Kapitein should know where the politics of resentment ultimately leads....if only they could learn from history.

5)  The US intervened in Bosnia to stop manifest ethnic cleansing.  It did not change borders.  That was done 'internationally' and at the UN.  The US certainly did not annex part of Serbia, as Putin did in Georgia.  It is too bad that Europeans in and of the balkans cannot negotiate self-determination for different peoples in a reasonable manner and in a broader 'democratic' space of tolerance.   The Czechs and Slovacs managed to do it. In the balkans, I suspect, it has to do with too much ethnicity-obsession (like Kapitein Andre's) and too few remnants of judeo-christian morality. 

6) I can't stop the Kapitein from descending in the gutter, neither in Charleroi nor anywhere else.  That is an easy decision for him to make, since he is already in bed with Putin.  Talking about delusional cynical soulmates...

Trom the Telegraph:

"Nato's top military commander has demanded the authority to draw up detailed military plans to defend former Soviet bloc members for the first time since the alliance expanded eastward.

Gen Craddock has already proposed that Estonia, the Baltic state that has a 20 per cent Russian speaking minority, should be the first country to undergo a formal military risk assessment."

Reuters has similar report.

NATO member states opposed to even drawing up plans for potential defense of other NATO member state? Possible rift over plan? Apparently, that's how far it has come with some EU "heavyweights".

Then I guess it all comes down to: Washington has somehow been "irresponsible" because it supported the wish of Latvians and Estonians to get a measure of protection against the possibilities of Russian (it can not be attributed to Russians resident in Baltic countries alone, nor would it stand a chance of success acting without support from Russia) irredentism - that very same "contentious" NATO membership. Considering what happened in Georgia, it looks prescient rather than irresponsible.

Russia's ability to project power through energy supplies, its intentions to use, as well as actual use of them as tool of force and manipulation in international relations have been on increase.

You consistently fail to identify by what entitlement should Russia's irritations (or security considerations) trump security considerations of countries on Russia's border? By what "right" or by which merits should Russia be accorded unchallenged ability to project military power regionally -- into Eastern Europe, -- where nearly all countries are averse to such a possibility? To the extent NATO enlargement limits and challenges this ability, what's so illegitimate in having this Russia's ability limited, or legitimate - in Russia's claim to having it?

In the end, the question NATO and Western countries will have to answer remains:

whether to continue pretending that there can be some kind of "partnership" with Russia at the expense of the sovereignty of some countries (legitimising Russia's claim to "sphere of influence" and unqualified "privileged interests"), or to refuse this claim and possibly pay the price - deteriorating relations with Moscow. I'm hopeful the answer will be the latter choice.

1.  The possibilities for irridentism remain. In addition, the Russian minorities have an electoral weight that can substantially influence policymaking, especially in the area of foreign relations.
 
2.  Again, it is the involvement of the United States in Baltic "protection" that irritates Moscow. Europe needs to develop its own mechanisms for collective security, as NATO remains US-centric.
 
3.  The American military presence in Europe is primarily about power projection capabilities. The "Revolution in Military Affairs" has demonstrated that the capacity to conduct technological warfare overrides infantry deployments. Indeed, after the conclusion of the Cold War, NATO and US bases have been used mainly for American power projection, whether to the former Yugoslavia, Iraq or Afghanistan. Russia understands this, and legitimately questions why an arrangement designed to deter Soviet aggression has become a tool for facilitating global American military operations of the variety that no other major power can match. Lastly, the United States still controls nuclear weapons on European soil.
 
4.  International law is not absolute. Moreover, it is upset if it paves over underlying disputes. There is no concrete evidence that Russia is curtailing the sovereignty of its neighbors - rather it appears to be engaging in a standard self-interested foreign policy, with all the security, economic and political ramifications that this implies. The separatist regions in Georgia and Moldova remain unresolved. So long as internationally recognized peacekeeping missions maintain their quasi-independent status, it is difficult to talk about Georgian and Moldovan sovereignty over them, respectively, or of recognized borders.

RE: 1)  States can believe in national rights irrespective of their type of government. To avoid citing the US as the sole example, both the Jewish and British states have and continue to believe in national rights, and act upon them.
 
RE: 2)  The British presence in Northern Ireland is a continuation of imperial and colonial policies some centuries old. Even the Northern Irish Protestants, who are unionists and whom the British forces are ostensibly there to protect are descendants of English and Scottish settlers. Through force of arms, England and later Great Britain have rendered a democratic resolution to the demographic and territorial entanglements nearly impossible. Nor did the British allow peaceful democratic resistance to their occupation.
 
RE: 5)  The United States changed Serbia's international borders by "brute force". Moreover, the South Ossetians have fought for their independence, which is why the region was only nominally Georgian. And if the Catholic Irish in Northern Ireland resumed armed struggle for the withdrawal of British forces - would you consider this "proper"? Can South Ossetian paramilitaries represent South Ossetians?
 
RE: 6)  You need to get laid or something. Enough with your "empirical observation" tripe. It's high time you visited Charleroi's red light district and hooked up with a Natasha - perhaps you'd "warm" to Russia a bit more comrade?

1) I can read Mr Handlery's para 1 and understand it.  The question is not "Can the Kapitein read para 1?", but rather "Does the kapitein understand it?".  A related question is "Does the kapitein believe that autocracies are truly guided in their actions by a belief in 'rights', or rather by the pretense of 'claimed rights' and by what one can get away with?".  We will never know the answer to such a question, because such an answer would require empirical observation combined with critical moral thinking.

2)  Indeed, objectivity is the key to proper judgment.  The past "British occupation" of Northern Ireland was NOT justified simply by the manifest fact that Britain was (and for the moment still arguably is) a liberal democracy.  No, that occupation was (temporarily) justified by the veracity of its stated goals.  Those goals essentially concerned the protection of basic individual rights for all the people of Northern Ireland, by preventing a minority (or anyone) from violently bombing itself into power.  And the believability or the veracity of those particular goals can only rest on the nature of the British political system, i.e. one of liberal democracy, where the people have the manifest power of changing its government (which requires freedom of political speech).  Countries do change over time, but change in the 'political culture' must come with the consent of the governed for such change to have any 'legitimacy'.

3)  So what is the point of this cryptic "lesson"?   That morality has no place in "international relations"?   Better throw in the towel now and drop the pretense, for in the postmodern world of deconstructionism one can say anything in furtherance of any goal.

4)   Such generalities are meaningless.  Judgments must always be made, and they must be made on the basis of 'objective' empirical observations, and honesty about one's own stated goals or intentions. 

5)  That is the tayler-made propagandistic version for "Putin's poodles".  The fact remains that Russia changed international borders by brute force.  Moreover, Russia does not recognise the right of its own "separatist regions" to secede from the empire. The example of Chechnya is clear enough.   I have in principle no objection to 'Ossetian' independance, but the proper way to achieve that is within a 'democratic' Georgia, or on the basis of  Ossetian willigness to fight for it. Absorption in Putin's mafia-state is not 'independence', and the Ossetians will re-learn that lesson, given enough time.  I am all for Flemish self-determination or independence, but I don't want it on the back of a German (or any other) army.  If the Flemish don't want to fight for it themselves, they do not deserve it.  And I don't think that it would even require a physical fight;  brains+determination+unity would be enough in the "semi-democracy" that is contemporary Belgium.   The operative word is "would".   The Flemish are no more silly than Americans voting for perverse self-hating Obama.

6) The "inuendo" is entirely of the Kapitein's own making.  A fertile imagination is good, up to a point.  But imagination divorced from reality (empirical observation, again) leads to disaster.

RE: 1)  Mr. Handlery: "Russia claims to have a right to the privilege that there be no NATO member on her borders" (par. 1).
 
RE: 2)  Political competition must be treated with objectivity. While a state's political culture, insofar as the legitimacy of power is concerned, may influence its foreign policy and international relations, political culture cannot be the sole benchmark against which the latter issues are compared. Indeed, is the British occupation of Northern Ireland legitimized by the UK being a liberal democracy? Are Northern Ireland's Catholic and republican paramilitaries illegitimate because they are not a recognized government, state or democracy?
 
RE: 3)   Moralizing international relations explains why American ties to Georgia were regarded as more important than those with Russia. Nearly a century ago, Russia decided for ideological reasons that Serbia was more important than Germany or Austria-Hungary. Now there's an "unpleasant lesson".
 
RE: 4)  American power is not beneficial to every country nor is it beneficial in equal measure. Furthermore, the power of other majors, notably China, can also be beneficial to other countries and sometimes even more so than the American alternative. 

RE: 6)  Russia reacted to a full-blown Georgian offensive aimed at retaking a separatist region under internationally-mandated peacekeeper control. The South Ossetians are former Russian subjects that were arbitrarily included in the Georgian SSR, and want to secede as much as the Kosovar Albanians, Croats or Slovenes.

RE: 7)  Ooh! Sexual innuendo.

Legal residence of former Soviet citizens who did not have citizenship of Baltic states is a done deal at least since 1995; Estonia and Latvia is their "own country" for all legal and practical purposes. Even Russia can not repatriate/lure any significant numbers of them -- overwhelming majority simply don't want to move.

No, NATO enlargement was a promise of protection for those who sought it and were ready to undertake democratic reforms. Write it off to historic memory, but there were very few countries for whom trying to stay neutral worked out well before and during WWII. I guess you could say that Russia was somewhat contained by those 4 fighter planes and radars in Baltics -- one doesn't hear about Russian planes violating their airspace nearly as often anymore...

Now the size of US military forces in Europe doesn't matter anymore..? I don't know how to respond to that -- damned if you have them, still damned if you have less?

Sorry, but it shouldn't matter what anyone considers or not considers part of Russia. There are internationally recognized borders, there is international law; Russia's claims to spheres of exclusive or "priviliged interest" are anathema to that and they may not be permitted to stand. Because implicit in those claims is what Mr. Handlery identifies as his first point: it would mean that small countries neighbouring Russia have only limited sovereignty. How far limited, under what conditions, when (if at all) those limitations would end, would then presumably be up to Russia to decide at will. "Washington's irresponsibility" or "Russia's encirclement" are just diversions from that crucial point, absent some credible threat to Russias's security in NATO's enlargement.

1) Au contraire, it is the Kapitein who introduced the word "right" into his commentary, and it is the kapitein who stated that Russia would have acted on the basis of a belief in a "right".  My contention is that authoritarian regimes do not give a hoot about "rights" (nor obligations) but are guided by 'opportunities' (or what they think they can get away with).  It is the nature of the regime that tells us indirectly what their true motivations and potential goals are.  Naturally, this applies not only to Putin-Russia, but just as much to Khamenei-Iran or to Kim's N-Korea.

2)  Indeed, all states will pursue their interests.  Just like all businesses will pursue theirs.  Yet, there can be very different perceptions of what true "national interests" are, and there is certainly no moral equivalence between different perceived 'interests'.   In the vacuous morality of postmodernist deconstructionists like the kapitein, words lose their meaning.  Indeed, the term "democracy" becomes utterly meaningless if one expands it to include states that have no freedom of political speech and no media freedom.  If the government controls the public, and the public cannot 'change' the government, we do not have a "democracy".  If one cannot make a distinction between the mafia and the German automobile industry, then rational discussion about economic (and political) competition becomes impossible or futile.  

3) Naturally, (almost) everybody will be guided by opportunity costs, but not everybody is constrained by a moral conscience.  Again, in order to judge 'conscience' geopolitically, one has to look domestically.  Political power that is unconstrained domestically, will not be constrained geopolitically. That is only common sense, and it is perhaps also the greatest lesson of history.  

4) How does presumed US "global power" threaten the average German citizen?   Does it threaten his or her individual freedoms in any way, to pursue internal self-government and economic well-being?   Then ask the same question for a citizen of Ukraine or Georgia with regard to Russian "global power", which is essentially based on 'alliances' with 'rogue regimes', all of whom have only one common goal, i.e. the indefinite perpetuation of their respective regimes (and not so-called "national interests").  For example, it is in the German and the American "interest" that Chinese and Arabs anywhere live in polities where there is genuine 'free' (and fair) political and economic competition between groups and 'interests'.  It is not in the interests of the Putin-regime, nor in that of the ayathollah theocracy, etc...that such conditions prevail elsewhere in the world.  On the contrary, just like in the old soviet days, the existence of freedom on the outside threatens authoritarian regimes, because it presents an 'intolerable' alternative for others to see.  Hence, their eternal need for popular indoctrination and for intimidation....to preserve autocracy.  

5) Whether Europe over time will be able to contain Russia militarily will depend on three factors: (a) oil prices and energy independence, (b) European internal political will, (c) US resistance to renewed pressures for 'isolationism'.   The outlook for factors B and C is very negative.   

6) Indeed, the US would "respond to a pro-Russia security re-alignment of Canada".  But, the US democratic political system would not tolerate a response similar to Putin's response to Georgia.  No doubt, the US would force Canada to make concrete choices, and it would try to preserve democracy in Canada.  It is the US government's constitutional obligation to preserve the freedom of all its citizens, not to enhance or extend the political life and power of any personal regime of Bush, Obama, Clinton, or whoever. 

7) Russia is a "semi-democracy"?  What a joke!  Then the kapitein must be a semi-virgin.   One either tolerates one's political opposition in FAIR and FREE elections, over and over again (not once or twice), or one doesn't.  And that makes all the difference, whether postmodern Europeans and naive-leftist Americans are willing to learn from history, or not, as the case may be.  

8) Indeed, diplomacy is 'ineffective' with Pyongyang and Tehran.  Go tell that to the 'adult' children, and to the soulmates Kappert and Obama!  

• NATO expansion is intended to further American power projection, to contain or monitor/control Russia, in terms of its access to airspace, oceans, etc. Given Russia's current conventional capabilities, the number of US ground forces based in Europe is now irrelevant.

• Over 15% of the Ukrainian population is ethnic Russian. Many Russians regard the Crimea as part of Russia, and Moscow wants its navy to retain access to its bases there for the foreseeable future, especially given the increased importance of the Black Sea during the South Ossetian War.

• Certainly, the Russian minorities in the Baltic republics need to be repatriated. Nevertheless, as long as they remain in substantial numbers, there is the potential for irridentism.

• Were France a living person rather than a country, he or she would fit the description of a sociopath. From French neo-imperialist and criminal activities in Africa, to its shoddy dealings with NATO, to its sly attempts to regain importance via the EU or Mediterranean regionalism, Alsace-Lorraine is but a mere line item on a laundry list.

"Again, Russia is encircled by NATO countries and/or American forces."

US was planning to cut the number of forces in Europe to 24000 (three, I think, brigade sized combat teams). Thanks to "resurgent Russia", part of the plan was put on hold autumn last year - two heavy BCT scheduled for redeployment for the time being will still remain based in Germany, leaving the US troop number in Europe at about 40000. It still is a reduction by about 30% from about 64000 in 2005. when "Rumsfeld plan" was announced. Forgive me, but there is very little Russia can show in a way of evidence to back the entire “wolf cry" about encirclement. Let’s do some kind of count:

– US access to bases in Bulgaria and Romania – up to one brigade on rotation basis for joint training purposes – those countries don't even share land borders with Russia;
– Missile defence sites, which are no mach for Russia's nuclear forces.
– 4 NATO fighter planes to patrol Baltic skies...

Anything else?

"However, Washington has acted irresponsibly to recruit ex-Soviet states, especially when some (incl. the Baltic republics and Ukraine) have frozen conflicts with Russia over territory, population and military deployments."

And this talking point, too, poorly reflects reality.

US, along with UK and Russia, has had far reaching "IOU" to Ukraine since 1994, related to Ukraine's agreement to give up its share of Soviet nukes. There is no "frozen conflict" regarding Ukraine's territory or population - unless and if Russia again decides to flagrantly violate some of its international obligations in order to create it.

The only "territorial conflict" any of Baltic states have with Russia concerns Estonian-Russian border treaty, which Russia refused to ratify, because it implausibly claims that this text contains territorial claims against Russia.

Both Latvia and Estonia have long since legalised the stay of former Soviet citizens, who settled there during occupation – at times, against common sense national interests. It was, for instance, thanks to American urging (Clinton administration), Latvia agreed to give residence to about 20000 demobilised Soviet military personnel plus their families, as part of agreement to pull Russian troops out. 20000 – that was more than Latvia's standing army and National guard combined.

Funny how it works - in order to avoid conflicts and for humanitarian reasons, Baltic states (unlike for instance France, when it regained Alsace-Lorraine) could not pick and choose, which settlers from former Soviet Union it wants to stay and which must go. Damned if you let them stay - it's a "frozen conflict", damned if you ask they go - "but, but, but - what about their human rights!!!"

If you think that Russia, by virtue of I-don't-know-what-right or claim to power, has to have effective veto in anything and everything Eastern European states or NATO do, just say so, please. Because it would be much more understandable position than "Russia encircled", "Washington irresponsible" diversion.

• Your comment on "rights" and "opportunities" is an off-topic riposte to my reply to Mr. Handlery

• Both democratic and undemocratic states can pursue their national interests with equal vigor. Within the "democratic" category, there is considerable variety in terms of type (i.e. representative or direct), as well as in other key areas such as transparency, media freedom, etc.

• Returning to the issue of foreign policy opportunity cost, democracies operate no differently. Indeed, the United States currently regards military action to halt the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes as too costly. Yet in 2003, the United States invaded and occupied Iraq ostensibly in order to neutralize its WMD capabilities. Again, while London acted to eject Argentine forces from the Falklands, it later allowed its servicemen to be captured and held by the IRGC without a shot fired.

• Russia's territorial size is irrelevant. Again, Russia is encircled by NATO countries and/or American forces. Neither the United States nor any other NATO member can make a similar argument (the Baltic states require a more detailed analysis). From a Russian perspective, the United States used the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to expand its own power globally, to such a degree that it is the sole empire among the major powers. China's military, on the other hand, remains largely defensive (the Taiwan issue notwithstanding) and its expansion is restrained.

• The United States does not require NATO to counter the Russian military - only access to airspace, maintenance of bases, etc. Indeed, nuclear capabilities aside, the militaries of Europe are equally capable of containing Russia. And when one looks at the problems faced by the Strategic Rocket Forces, well...

• Of course every country should have the right of sovereignty and self-determination. However, Washington has acted irresponsibly to recruit ex-Soviet states, especially when some (incl. the Baltic republics and Ukraine) have frozen conflicts with Russia over territory, population and military deployments.

• The United States would question and respond to a pro-Russia security realignment of Canada, especially given current Canadian-American security integration e.g. NORAD, military sales, joint training etc.

• Putin's legitimacy is based on his office. And like it as not, Russia is a semi-democracy.

• Both Pyongyang and Tehran have proven unresponsive to economic pressure and incentives. Their power is based on ideological not economic considerations, and is maintained by control over their military/security forces. Diplomacy has been largely ineffective and buying off these regimes would create a nasty precendent.

1) What a load of nonsense the kapitein keeps spewing.  Against all historical evidence  he seems to think that authoritarian regimes would be guided by (or act on) the basis of "rights", instead of on the basis of 'opportunities'. 

-- If Putin's autocracy hasn't acted yet in certain places it is simply because the 'costs' were judged (for the moment) to be too high and/or the venture was judged to be too risky.

-- Russia is the largest landmass on this earth.  If NATO is surrounding European Russia, it could just as well be argued that Russia is surrounding NATO.  In fact, only Switserland is truly surrounded by NATO and by the EU, and it is only the EU-encirclement that presents a real problem for the Swiss, not the NATO-encirclement.  Moreover, the Putin-regime is a unitary regime. By contrast, NATO is an American alliance with 'reluctant' Europeans, including 'coalition' governments (like the German one) where part of the coalition is de facto anti-NATO.    

-- If NATO can be said to have been founded as an "anti-soviet block", it could better be said that the soviet union was founded on an ideology which wanted world domination for Marxism.  In fact, NATO was founded as a defensive organisation against further Stalinist aggression in Eastern Europe and threatened aggression against Western Europe.   None of this is relevant to answer Mr Handlery's question, which was: do Russia's neighbors have a right to self-determination, or not?  

-- The US does not question Canada's sovereignty, and its right to engage in whatever 'alliances' it wants to engage in.  And, as long as Canada remains a genuine democracy, there would be no reason to do so.  There is not a single example in history of military aggression between democracies.  Putin knows that too (but the Kapitein no longer does) and Putin will exploit that to the fullest.  His complaints about "encirclement" are a ruse, to justify the restoration of a Russian empire.  After all, his 'legitimacy' rests now on such a nationalistic ideology. It certainly does not rest on any professed attachment to Marxism, nor to democracy.  

3) There are numerous historical examples, besides the experience with Hitler, that support Mr Handlery's "unpleasant lesson".  And there are numerous examples of governments that have refused to learn that lesson.   

4) It is nonsense to claim that "sanctions have proven useless" against Iran.  Just like in the case of Iraq, sanctions have not been seriously enforced and have been resisted and undermined by several NATO 'allies'.  The reality is that a number of European countries want someone else to 'take care of the problem' (guess who?), and that Russia and China will make sure that that is what will happen.  Like irresponsible children, they are playing with 'fire'.  
 

I. Preference is not the same as right. If Moscow truly believed in this "right", it would have exercised it before the Kaliningrad Oblast was surrounded by NATO territory, namely that of Poland and Lithuania. As it is, European Russia is encircled by NATO, from Norway to Turkiye. Russia's primary security ally, Belarus, borders three NATO members and an aspiring one. And the entire Russian Navy, save the Caspian Flotilla faces NATO or American-controlled waters if it attempts to leave its bases in the Pacific Ocean or the Baltic, Barents or Black Seas. Given that NATO was founded as anti-Soviet security bloc and has no comparable equal such as the defunct Warsaw Pact, and given that it is expanding further into East-Central Europe and Central Asia, how is Moscow supposed to regard these developments as friendly? Indeed, were Canada to enter into a defense pact with Russia and both countries were to integrate their militaries, one would expect the United States to use economic and political countermeasures to indicate its feelings on the matter.
 
II. Europe should have no issue allowing Russian-controlled pipelines to compete with non-Russian ones. Nor is the problem jockeying by Russia, China and the United States for access to Central Asian energy. Central Asia remains an illiberal and undemocratic region on the brink of full-blown authoritarianism or conversely, Islamic theocracy. Neither option affords a rational, national self-interested and economic approach to energy development and export. Thus, the key remains to find alternatives to energy from anywhere outside Europe.
 
III. Western reluctance to halt Hitler's aggression cannot be the only historical example used to inform contemporary policymakers and foreign policy issues.
 
IV. Teheran is perfectly aware that both the United States and Israel are prepared to commit to unilateral, joint or Coalition military operations if Iran reaches certain 'red lines' with regard to nuclear weapons capabilities. Sanctions have proven useless. Not unlike the WPK/KPA, the Islamic Republic has given little attention to its economic and demographic problems, prefering to focus on maintaining control of politics and the military. Secondly, it is not in Russia's interests to alienate a country that has tremendous influence in Central Asia, at a time when Russia faces Islamisation beyond and within its borders and is in a hudna with Islam.
 
V. Arguably, the contents of the M.V. Faina would end up in "the wrong hands" whether the vessel reached its destination or not. Certainly, the ship will be destroyed if the pirates are determined to seize the contents. It seems that the United States is keen on having the EU and others deal with Somali piracy - and rightly so. Indeed, to engage in littoral operations when conflict looms with Iran over the Strait of Hormuz, is senseless.

But your facts, instead of refuting my argument, merely confirm the longstanding enmity that exists between Castroite Cuba and the USA. And yet, pursuant to Kennedy's bargain, we have not invaded again, and they have not contested our long-term occupation of Guantanamo.

Too bad about the Bay of Pigs. From what I've read, Kennedy turned it into a sham with no purpose other to maintain his anti-Communist credentials, having withdrawn the naval and air support essential to its success.

- Cuban missil bases were not completed, though closer to the U.S. than 'Jupiter' and 'Thor' to Russia.
- Cuban criminals, like Orlando Bosch, live happily in the U.S.
- Anti-American activity – what a shame!
- States founded with that revolutionary Cuban army – you mean Angola and your pal José Eduardo dos Santos?
- 'Perpetual symbol' – that's all there is!

@ kappert
 
To quote Adlai Stevenson at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, "I am prepared to wait for an answer till hell freezes over, if that is your decision. And I'm also prepared to present the evidence in this room".

Come on, it's not that difficult. If it's a choice between the life of the child, or the child killer and one of them has to die, which one?

Cuba hosted nuclear missiles aimed at the USA, trains its people to hate the USA, dumps its surplus criminals on the USA, promotes anti-American political and military activity worldwide, and when it could afford to, stirred up wars with its "revolutionary" army in which the USA had to get involved.

Cuba has merit as a perpetual symbol, however, of the fact that leftists will applaud any dictatorship, now matter how brutal and corrupt, as long as it declares itself anti-capitalist, anti-American, and/or anti-Zionist.

I'd support the killing of a child killer to save the life of an innocent child.My question to you is, would you?

Prudence. The pacifist believes he will feel pangs of bad conscience if he soils his hands in any cause. He thinks ahead to preserve either his soul or his reputation. Of course, if he actually applauds a cause that necessarily involves the exercise of violence, he is not really a pacifist at all but a common hypocrite.

The bloodthirsty sadist in your example does not realize he will destroy his soul by exercising wanton cruelty and does not care whether his cause is good or evil. If he spouts ideology he is a hypocrite too, but probably less common.

Ernesto Guevara was Argentinian and a quite violent guy. No doubt about it. You seem to adhere the myth of that fellow!

I didn't know that Cuba invaded the U.S. of A., nor is it to my knowledge that the Cubans wanted to kill several times the U.S. president.

Q: What is the fundamental difference between:
 
i  Che Guevara who said:
 
"Crazy with fury I will stain my rifle red while slaughtering any enemy that falls in my hands! My nostrils dilate while savoring the acrid odor of gunpowder and blood...".
 
and
 
ii  A European 'pacifist' like kappert, who supports the revolution, (purportedly) eshews all violence, while at the same time placing a higher value on the life of a child killer above that of the child killer's innocent victims? 
 
see: node/3534#comment-28235

Please add contempt for cowardice to the long list of Mr. Handlery's virtues as a writer.

With respect to Cuba, it conducts itself as an enemy of the U.S.A. in every imaginable way. Until it ceases to do so it should be treated accordingly.

In an ideal world (i.e the 'kappertian' worldview) we should return Cuba to its rightful owners the Guanajatabeyes. Clearly, this is no longer an option but the least the 'kappertians' could do is to consider moving Cuba's  capital from Havana to Tallahassee, Florida.
 
"The earliest inhabitants of Cuba were the Guanajatabey people ... researchers have speculated that the Guanajatabeyes may have migrated from the south of the United States...".   Wiki.
 
see: The First Cubans
 
http://www.historyofcuba.com/history/oriente/tainos.htm
 
Or am I just Che dreaming?
 
 
 

 
Time might heal and appeasement postpone the inevitable conflict but, as your experiences with myself can attest, they sure as hell don't make your enemies go away.
 
Welcome back, kappert.

1.Superpowers and their neighbours/independence in conflict with security: in plain English, the U.S. of A should finally recognize the sovereignty of Cuba and end the boycott.
2.For more than 40 years, Europe lives happily under the Russian 'gas threat'. Exploring the Caucasus only would rise new conflicts in the area.
3.Agreed.
4.For now 12 years, there are inspections in Iran without delivering any proof of military nuclear achievements.
5.Each and every U.S. citizen has to pay 2300 Dollars to the banks. They will not forget it too soon.
6.As José Barroso states: 'we don't know what caused the crisis' (!); 'we have to reestablish confidence in the system' (!). Should we believe such crap?
8.Wise words for bankers.
12.Ukrainian military transport in Somali waters – and there are voices which plea to let them join NATO!
13.Swiss border control to mafia-controlled-Liechtenstein is absolutely necessary. The tiny state robs billions each and every year.
14. The policy to corrupt authorities is deeply rooted in the Western mind.