1) -- Whether a nuclear weapon becomes defensive or offensive depends on the nature of the 'owner' of that weapon.  It does not reside in the weapon itself.

-- Whether the Iranian decision is "understandable" is irrelevant from a Western perspective.  What should matter is that it is unacceptable or intolerable.

--  It is fascinating to see a German writing about Iran "continuing its nuclear program" (in a military sense, given the context).  For years the Germans pretended to believe official Iranian assurances, or at least never seemed to be 'in a hurry' on the matter.

--  It is even more fascinating to see a (supposedly sofisticated) German claiming that "notions of right or wrong" can only cloud the issue.  That is mindboggling, to say the least, but it is pretty much representative of contemporary European presumed 'sofistication'.  And yes, I know there are no "universal(ly accepted) notions of right or wrong".  As if that were relevant to the necessity for moral judgment!

-- Indeed, there may be something wrong with "cloaking" (anything), depending on the circumstances, but what really is "terribly wrong" is the denial of a "common good".  That is the road to perdition...and a road many Germans have taken before, even in recent times.

2) I see: because we have survived 'Pakistan' so far, we should not try to prevent a second 'Pakistan'?  Sounds like: we have survived one Hitler, so why couldn't we survive two?  I see the 'logic', or should I say illogic.  And, yes, the sovereignty of a criminal should not be equated with that of a 'good' person.  The same applies to regimes and political systems.  Sorry, but if sofisticated Europeans want to put their judgement (about "good") - including their moral judgment - on hold, our survival as free peoples will become very tenuous.

6) Obviously, the Kapitein is not a discerning reader.  But, I prefer to stick to the subject at hand.  Mixing apples and oranges does not tend to promote clarity.

7) No, this assumes much more than a possible Iranian assault on Israel.  There are many other potential dangers ahead.  But, it certainly assumes that the Iranian theocracy will be guided by very different "notions of right and wrong" than mine.  However, contemporary Germans seem to believe that any such notions can no longer be in play.  That is the surest indication of the victory of naive-left ideology in Western civilisation today: the extremely naive idea that others are (or reason) like themselves. It is the supreme victory of wishful thinking over empirical observation.  

RE:

1) The offensive nature of any Iranian nuclear weapon is refuted. The issue at stake is that the potential for offensive use or misuse is greater with Iran than with Israel, not unlike American versus Russian nuclear "reliability". The Israeli decision that any nuclear potential on the part of Iran is impermissible is as understandable as the Iranian decision to continue its nuclear programme. One must choose one side or the other, however, interjecting supposedly universal and objective notions of right and wrong only clouds the matter. There is nothing wrong with being partial, however, there is something terribly wrong with cloaking personal interests with that of the common good.

3) Pakistan already set that precedent. Or is this containment at the price of sovereignty?

6) Perhaps it is time you shared some of that knowledge accumulated over your lifetime in your comments. They are quite bereft of any meaningful ideas on the subject.

7) This assumes that the Iranian state is irrational, and is preparing for a suicidal assault on Israel. Pakistan, which has come very near on several occaisions to nuclear conflagration with India, of course, adheres to logic.

1) So, what is the relevance of all these assertions and opinions, given the context of Mr Handlery's point 2 in the article?  None of this refutes the common sensical idea that the jewish bomb is defensive, and the mullah's bomb won't be?  As always, if you want to know how people will behave externally, look at how they behave internally (i.e. how they treat their own 'opposition').

2)  Relevance?   Did anybody question the need for "caution"?

3) Talking about "cherrypicking"!  I did not pick 1953, nor any other date. In my response I did state that I had not forgotten 1953, nor have I forgotten the holocaust nor Helen of Troy, etc...The Kapitein can for ever repeat the same silly mantra of "American interference", and it has no relevance whatsoever for the dangers ahead, i.e. a nuclear bomb in the hands of an apocalyptic theocracy in cahoots with islamic terrorists.  

5) Indeed, France was partially responsible for its "risk" in 1938.  Did anybody claim the opposite?  I made the claim that France was more at risk than Germany (because of the different natures of their regimes).  And just like France put its head in the sand ignoring the "risk" emanating from the east, so contemporary Western apologists like the kapitein have a greater responsibility for the ayathollah's bomb coming to fruition than more clear-headed people do.

6) Why should I read Spengler?  What could I possibly learn from Spengler about "economic development"?  I spent most of my life dealing with issues of economic underdevelopment.  What is the relevance to the issue of Handlery's article and, more specifically, the coming second muslim nuclear power?

7) Dream on, trusting the ayatollahs to behave 'responsibly' with nuclear devices in the future?!.  The awakening is going to be quite a scene, not even comparable to the awakening among many in Europe and America in 1939.  

 RE:

1. Both Iran and Iraq were in weakened states following the First Gulf War for various reasons. This is not to say that their military power was on par with 10 years prior, but the geostrategic goals of each remained the same. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has long vied for superiority in the region, and it is a Western ally, at least nominally. Lastly, Iraqi ambitions and capabilities were two very different things; Iraqi WMD stocks were mainly gone by 2003.

2. Iran, like China and Russia takes the long view. Exercising caution with Russia does not necessarily equate with antagonizing it.

3. 1953 is far more pertinent to US-Iranian relations than the sacking of Troy. Cherry-picking history will not change Iran's mind, it will only confuse your own. American interference does not justify the internal repression of the Mullahs nor their foreign policy. However, it is a key part of the "how" and the "why" things are where they are.

5. France was to a large extent responsible for its risk, given its actions and policies in prior decades. Poland's only way out was to surrender ethically Polish people and territory to delay the inevitable.

6. Read Spengler at the Asia Times re: the Iranian economy.

7. Any Iranian nuclear weapon would be for the defense of the regime. Its possession protects the Mullahs as the enriched uranium in North Korea protects Kim, the army and the Party. The United States will never attempt regime change when faced with the possibility of even a tactical nuclear weapon being deployed against its forces. Rather than brining wayward states into line, Operation Iraqi Freedom only exacerbated their insecurities. Unfortunately, not every concern, be it Iranian, Israeli, etc. can be assauged in this scenario, and the Israelis have a much stronger case. However, to assume that enriching uranium is purely for the purposes of attacking Israel is wrong. If that was going to happen, it would have already, given Pakistan's arsenal and the past proliferation of Pyongyang, Pakistani scientists, etc.

1)  And Iraq's strength was not "depleted" by the First Gulf war?  My God, Iraq was in a UN-imposed box-with-holes (underminded by European and nonEuropoean cynics) and was under the strictures of no-fly zones over two-thirds of its territory.  So, it would have been definitely unreasonable for Teheran to see Baghdad as a major threat in recent times. And, unlike the Kapitein, they did not. They saw something very different, i.e. they saw an opportunity (for shia hegemony).   And Saddam "pursued regional hegemony and WMD capabilities"?  Really!!  I thought that was a Bush-invention according to the BDS (Bush-derangement-syndrome) crowd in Europe and America.  Have we come full-circle now? Now that the cultural-left controls both sides of the Atlantic. 

2) Teheran has no illusions about the Russians?  Good for them!  Because in Germany they seem to be wallowing in such illusions today (and I am not just talking about Die Linke).

3)  I wrote "over the last 35 years.   Today we are in 2009.  Thirty-five years ago was 1974.   Mossadegh, 1953, and all that, I have not forgotten.  Neither have I forgotten Helen of Troy.  When are Western apologists for intolerant undemocratic regimes  going to stop abusing history for nefarious contemporary purposes?  When the cultivated self-hatred runs dry?

4) At last, a sign of realism and common sense!

5) Dream on!  The issue is not what could be, but what is.  We are all at risk, but not equally.  And some of us are more "at risk" because of our respective ideologies.  Believe me, in 1938 France was more "at risk" than Germany, and it had nothing to do with "natural resources and position", but everything with ideology.

6) No, Iran's economy is in no way comporable to Palestine.  It is sitting on black gold.   And, yes, Iran could gain from American friendship.  But, Iran is NOT free.  It is occupied by a clique with a destructive ideology.  And the primary reponsibility for that 'occupation' rests with the Iranian people and their culture. 

7) Everybody - well almost everybody - faces threats.   So what is the point?  Did anybody, or did Mr Handlery, complain about Iran's "defense expenditures"?   He did however claim that "Iran's bomb-to-be is not defensive". And, both common sense as well as Iran's history suggest that he is right.   Even congenital Western apologists should draw the necessary conclusions.  

I. The military strength of Iran was depleted by the ravages of the Iran-Iraq War, by American-led embargoes and by the aftershocks of the revolution that decimated the officer corps. Given the Islamic Republic's reliance on pre-revolutionary hardware, including British armor and American aircraft, and the lack of replacements and spare parts, it was not unreasonable for Teheran to still consider Baghad a major threat. Saddam continued to pursue regional hegemony and WMD capabilities which he used both for war and internal repression.

II. Russia has a long history of interest and interference in Iran. While Moscow and Beijing have blunted efforts to curb the Iranian nuclear programme, and the former has offered to provide Teheran with civilian nuclear power (note that the reactor construction is stalled), Teheran is under no illusions that the Russians are friendly.

III. Perhaps you forget 1953? Or support of the Shah? Or agitation against the Mullahs? Or aiding Iraq during the war with conventional and unconventional weapons?

IV. Of course, Iran poses a significant threat to Israel. Iran is Israel's most important enemy, given its nuclear programme, the statements of various leaders, and its aid to anti-Israeli insurgents as well as Syria, another enemy of Israel, albeit a much weaker one.

V. Iran can obviously mitigate these threats by being completely transparent about its nuclear programme and in accordance with the NPT and IAEA regulations. Although the tensions with Israel can be resolved quickly, Iran remains geostrategically at risk due to its natural resources and position within Central Asia.

VI. The Revolution reduced the Iranian economy from one comparable with Spain to one comparable with Palestine. Instead of "palling around" with impoverished insurgents in Lebanon and Gaza, Teheran might want to consider the benefits that American friendship brought Iran. In fact, Iran stands to gain more from American friendship than any alternative.

VII. I am not apologizing for the Mullahs. They forced a rising nation to take a major step backward in order to satisfy ideological considerations that are not logically defensible. Nevertheless, Iran is facing threats (incl. those it created), and even a cursory look at its history uncovers a strong rationale for higher-than-normal defense expenditures. 

....

2)  -- The references of the Kapitein to Irak and Russia do not make sense.  After the defeat of Saddam in the first Gulf War in 1991, Iraq was in no position to threaten Iran, and Iran is in any case a much larger country than Iraq.  Russia has been assisting Iran with civilian nuclear energy. 

-- In what sense has the US been "Interfering" in Iranian politics over the last 35 years?  Is the Kapitein just parroting a mantra from the ayatholla regime (a mantra which it needs to retain some sliver of legitimacy domestically)?  The existing very limited international embargoes were imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations from the late nineties on, in direct response to Iran's violations of its signature under the Nonproliferation treaty.  And, just like in the case of UN Security Council sanctions against Saddam, it is Germany and similar shortsighted countries that have been undermining the limited UN embargo against Iran.

--  Also, the notion that Israel poses a threat to Iran as a nation is ludicrous. It does pose a threat for Iran's nuclear program, but that is entirely the result of two factors: (a) first, Iran's regime has publicly threathened on several occasions to wipe Israel from the map, and (b) Iran is building nuclear weapons.

In short, the Kapitein has once again turned the world upside down, or put the cart before the horse.  To put it very simply:  no Iranian nuclear weapons program, no military threat from Israel nor America. 

The question arises why do western apologists for a theocracy aspiring to nuclear weapons (and with an apocalyptic bent) confuse cause and effect? Just like they do in the case of Putin's restoration of autocracy in Russia? Anybody care to advance some rational hypotheses to explain this kind of perverse western self-hatred? Or, could it be that these self-haters are not really that 'western' anymore in terms of values?

1. Socialism has always had a colorful relationship with nationalism. Despite his own origins in Georgia, Stalin selectively embraced nationalism both inside the Soviet Union and throughout its allies newly acquired by the Red Army. The DDR was in fact identical to the Third Reich save for ideological differences and the lack of Hitler's looming personality cult. However, I disagree that ex- or neo-communists have "manufactured" fascist or ultra-nationalist strawmen. Nationalist and anti-communist insurgents were very active in the Baltic states, Poland and the Ukraine during and after the war, and required considerable resources, manpower and casualties to defeat. The Forest Brothers were still active up until the mid-1980s when the KGB made its last arrests. Lastly, nationalism was vital to the socialism practiced in Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia; socialists have long known that the nation is a superior affinity to class. So too, of course, have their enemies.

2. Iran was threatened by Iraq prior to 2003. Lacking WMDs, Saddam's invasion was repelled at great cost. Moreover, Iran was powerless against the chemical weapons deployed by Saddam against its soldiers and cities. Iran has always faced the threat of Russian interference and invasion since the "Great Game" and Anglo-Soviet occupation. The United States has long interferred in Iranian politics, has launched embargoes against Iran and is poised to strike or possibly invade the country. Lastly, there is the threat of Israeli airstrikes, now made possible via Iraqi airspace courtesy of the United States. Taste of government aside, Iran is very much threatened. While Iranian/Shia supremacism should be combated, Iran has numerous and real security concerns that can be allayed by the West.

4. Agreed. Reminiscent of the captured British marines/hostages.

5. I applaud the Sri Lankan efforts. The military requested 3 years to do the job, got it sans handcuffs and delivered. Whereas the Wehrmacht/Waffen-SS quelled resistance by killing civilian and soldier alike, Sri Lanka has done it with a minimum of civilian casualties, although the Tamils would cry foul if one person was wounded. Or perhaps they are just poor losers?