Duly Noted: The Best Ally of Guerrillas
From the desk of George Handlery on Sat, 2009-11-07 10:50
1. America’s “separation” from the Iraq conflict is not unlikely. Another possible scenario is her “withdrawal” from the struggle in Afghanistan. These prospects create a background for the discussion of irregular wars, their legends and their realities.
For some time now, we are living in the age of asymmetric warfare. In these conflicts, it is typical that guerilla forces confront regular armies. Concentrating on the success-cases, a stifling myth is unfolding. It is that guerillas or to use the leftist term, partisans, cannot be defeated. This legend is probably one of the most potent weapons in the arsenal of irregular warriors. If they win, they prevail in a test of wills. That amounts to a trial of endurance and it involves a conflict that the societies that regular armies of established states serve do not consistently regard as critical for their survival. If, therefore, the price to be paid is PR-effective and the dramatized toll is prolonged, the advice of “sound and moderate minds” to “disengage” will tend to prevail. Political cultures that use automatic transmissions and ready-to-eat food demand instant success as in instant coffee. In addition, the solutions stipulated are to be fast while they are to be achieved without discomfort. Engagements that are continuous and lack heroics as much as a clear deadline for their conclusion with fanfares, do not fit these preferences.
Admittedly, guerillas can be smothered by the full deployment of the massive forces of well-organized powers. The more so when the tactical use of these means is not held back by humanistic considerations. Systems that are not only willing to cause and to accept collateral damage but also feel justified to use indiscriminate violence to their strategic benefit, enjoy an advantage. If suppression is implemented with consistent and unleashed brutality, the fear created will not mute into hatred and resistance. Much rather, the policy will cow the population whose support guerillas need. (Suppose that a tank takes fire from one of the four houses around it. One solution is to send in a squad to look for the sniper and to try to apprehend him. The other solution is to have four tanks between the houses. Each fires its cannon at one of the buildings. Starting at the bottom this is done until the structures collapse. Soon the neighboring streets will present no problem. Here an objection can be anticipated. It builds on the case of the USSR in Afghanistan. The failure confirms rather than refutes the argument. Unlike in 53 in Berlin, in 56 in Budapest, or in 68 in Prague, the Kremlin was limited by global reactions, internal conflict and the system’s crisis.)
Certain political systems will find it impossible, for reason of their political culture, to apply all their means without what they consider moral limits. On this level then, the best ally of guerillas is the democratic political system and its prejudices. At the same time, guerilla movements will quite frequently be enabled by their totalitarian ideology to commit all of their limited means to achieve maximal damage.
In using the myth of invincibility supported by selected examples so as to plead the case for withdrawal, it is convenient to ignore a salient fact behind guerilla success. Regardless of Guevara style T-Shirt romanticism, successful guerillas are hardly a crowd of barefooted guys in need of a shower and a decent hair cut. Where they prevail, guerillas have the support of foreign powers. This goes beyond the supply of weapons and includes political threats and diplomatic pressure as well as the PR work of state-run propaganda.
A conclusion: Guerillas do not defeat established states and their armies on their own. They are helped by bystanders and ultimately they are allowed to win by their exhausted or bored foes.
2. Even if they might be fighting each other, modern dictatorships are connected by a common denominator. It is their radical collectivism. The goals and ways they proclaim tend to suggests to the analytical minded that the allegedly common factors call for an awareness regarding the common elements. Any consciousness of these similarities leads one to perceive a high degree of community. It is also presumed that this perceived communality of interests can be and, for ethical reasons, should be converted into a political organization that is dedicated to pursue the welfare of all members. Regarding that welfare, it is alleged that it leads to a state of happiness. Due to its expression of a virtue, it is to take priority over the wishes and aspirations of all other – by implication inferior – group interests. The implication is that for the benefit of the select, the misfortune and subjugation of all others is not only permitted but also an expression of ethical necessity. Once this is accepted the movement’s members are called upon to legalize the elimination of those that allegedly compete with them for power and the material components of existence.
3. Those who declare themselves uninterested in responding to Iran’s nuclear armament projects tend to let you know that they do not feel exposed. The case suggests that threats are generally identified as local. In this case, “local” means that the peril is seen as directed against someone who is not too near where the elegantly unconcerned one sits. This is a perception that survives boldly against the storm of cruel facts. Such as developing rockets that will easily reach wide areas that are “behind you”. Equally overheard are threats that are made loudly and phrased carelessly so that your kind falls comfortably and unmistakably into the long list of the enemies of mankind that are to be liquidated. No matter how harsh and threatening: Political Correctness demands that there be no alerting effect. The last century’s vicissitudes came to visit upon us and murdered scores of millions. The project and the intent to carry it out has only been a surprise to the victim. Regrettably so, even if the warnings were clear and consistent. The repeated stepping into the same trap – albeit set by different violators – had been preceded by the same question of the intended victim. It sounded something like “why should they be serious about wanting to do that”? The implication was that, besides the supposed insufficiency of the means, there was no rational motive in the mind of the victims that would have justified their elimination. This is comparable to the porker of the pig-farm asking why the kind master should want to slaughter them. After all, their relationship seems to be sooo undisturbed and based upon mutual liking. The answer is not in a fault of the pigs but follows from the fact that “sausage tastes so good”.
4. Sometimes, anecdotes can reveal more of the “story” than scientific investigation and the clever reporting of the publicly available data might be able to convey. Take the case of my village’s hairdresser. The good woman runs a family-centered shop that her elders have founded. Since the parents are getting old, the lady needs help. By local standards, unemployment at 3-4% terribly high. At the same time young people who have absolved the country’s excellent trade apprentice system are, even though professionally well prepared, having problems to find jobs. So, help was hired. The new girl argued with customers and made special price cuts without asking the boss. One day then, close to closing time, the help was told that Mr. X is still due to come in for a cut. We can close once he is finished. Undaunted, the girl got dressed and left the store as Mr. X arrived. After that, she joined the unemployed. The story behind the story is that many job opportunities exist -for the right people. All too often unemployability is a reflection of the wrong attitude. You might relate that to adulthood comportment taught to once spoiled children shaped by a permissive educational system and ripened by a culture that forgives anything at anytime to anybody.
5. Immigration, or more precisely the integration of individuals of diverging backgrounds is a wide spread problem of developed societies. Those that are suspicious of immigrants and the ones that automatically defend anything that is done by persons with a “migration background” tend to suppress a crucial fact. It is a factor that is easily ignored, which is why the migrants themselves are inclined to overlook it. It is that if a person amounts to anything he must be more than the sum of the factors that amount to his ethnic background. Admittedly, realizing this and organizing ones life accordingly is difficult. Confusing signals come from progressive social policies, such as quotas and the support programs. These tend to judge individuals because of their membership in certain privileged-because-underprivileged groups. According to that condition-based judgment, support is given – or withheld. The consequence is devastating. It makes membership in the herd, and the continued practice of some of its collective bad habits that are out of tune with the conditions offered by advanced societies, to become a personal advantage.
RE: The Best Ally of Guerrillas
Submitted by Kapitein Andre on Sun, 2009-11-08 23:39.
Asymmetric warfare is nothing new. Mr Handlery should think carefully before attributing the terrorist–freedom fighter debate to the greater left–right one. The American experience with Great Britain and that of various European nations occupied by National Socialist Germany should prove instructive in this regard. Mr Handlery will also note that asymmetical forces tend to pay a terrible price for victory, as the NLF/PAVN did to effect French and American withdrawals, and so too the various Afghani tribes to eject Soviet forces. Indeed, despite suffering “defeat”, regular forces usually walk away with stunning casualty ratios in their favor.
Moreover, Mr Handlery’s sniper scenario suffers from historical counter–examples. German forces encountered ferocious and costly resistance in Poland, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, despite using overwhelming and unencumbered force against irregulars and civilians alike. So too, did the Red Army in Ukraina and later in Afghanistan. Neither the Germans nor the Soviets were constrained by negative public opinion of either costs or methods of their respective campaigns. Prosecution of the "War on Terror" is made difficult by a multitude of factors, which while confounding, were evident well before "Mission Accomplished" was hastily declared.
Mr Handlery blames socialist and liberal sentiments for derailing counter–insurgency operations by the West, without providing even the most cursory cost–benefits analysis of the West’s “small wars”. Indeed, more often than not, it is liberals and socialists who favor occupation (e.g. JFK, LBJ, Blair, Brown, etc.); neo–conservatism’s emergence and foreign policy revisions are relatively recent. One will note that neo-conservative's were convinced that occupation-lite would work...Indeed, after the humiliation of Vietnam, Americans were captivated by the success and casualty ratios of the First Gulf War.
The United States and ISAF can succeed in Central–South Asia, if they kill every single last Pashtun man, woman and child on both sides of the border. This can either be accomplished by storming each cave in the rugged border regions, or by deploying WMDs. Otherwise, their forces will face constant harassment and suffer attrition. If civilian leaders and their electorates consider this a reasonable price to pay and the mission to be “worth it”, then there is little the Taliban or Al–Qaeda can do. The Russians know how to deal with Muslims: kill them all, or support “friendly” strongmen.