Political or Civic Religion for a Trans-Ethnic Society (*)

In an earlier essay I presented some explanations for the remarkable degree of religiosity that can be observed in the USA, and contrasted this with the high degree of de-Christianization that has occurred in Europe over the past half century or more.   In subsequent commentary, Thomas Bertonneau (TB) agreed with a basic tenet of that article, i.e. the crucial rejection of the concept of a state religion by the 18th century Founding Fathers of the American Republic:

“To the extent that men like Washington and Jefferson were religious, they leaned toward Deism. In character, they are opposite types to the Puritan theocrats. The Constitution, while acknowledging the religious element of the society that it proposed to bring to order, nevertheless established a secular – and in particular a non-sectarian – polity. If we believed the myth that the American beginning is in Massachusetts, then the Constitution would necessarily be a deliberate break with the New England continuum. I argue that this is so.” (TB)

This provides the basis for some further reflection on the essence of the American ‘civic religion’ that the “Virginia Gentlemen” (TB) among the American founders intended, and that could possibly continue to supply guidance for any trans-ethnic society.  

Americans, Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders…are not really like Chinese, Japanese, Russians, or Turks.  At a superficial level, that is stating the obvious.  However, at a deeper level, it reflects a different history, for sure, but also a different kind of civic religion.   The former group of nationalities, rooted in pioneer settler societies supplemented by immigrants from around the world, largely identify with a common ‘civic core’ (of political principles and laws).  By contrast, the identities of the latter group remain tightly bound with ethnicity.
   

The American Civic Core

What is the American civic core?  Many would say that it can be summarized by “Jeffersonian democracy”.  To cite but one famous example, Chesterton (1) called America:

“…the experiment of a democracy of diverse races which has been compared to a melting-pot.  But even that metaphor implies that the pot itself is of a certain shape and a certain substance; a pretty solid substance. The melting pot must not melt. The original shape was traced on the lines of Jeffersonian democracy; and it will remain in that shape until it becomes shapeless”.     

Among the Founding Fathers of the new ‘American experiment’ at the time of independence, men like Jefferson, Madison, Franklin and others, were Enlightenment intellectuals who were keenly aware of the history of the centuries of religious strife in Europe.  Moreover, the long independence struggle with the British Crown left an abiding dislike for political autocracy and for aristocratic society.   Their extensive writings reveal attachment to both (a) ‘Deism’ that is skeptical toward sectarian theology, and to (b) ‘democracy’ which was intended to make the citizens’ thought and speech free, and individuals safe from arbitrary political power.  Their Deism was largely anti-theological, in the sense that it had no definite theology.  Indeed, one of its central themes was that theology is trumped by civic ethics.   To illustrate, a famous quote from Thomas Jefferson (2):

“It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no God.  It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg”.   

Jefferson was in effect saying that his pocket and legs were more important than his theology, or that civic virtues that lead to public safety and preservation of private property were more important than points of doctrine.   The Founding Fathers, by and large, abhorred “fanaticism”, and laid the foundations for American pragmatism and even for American anti-intellectualism.    For them, concepts of freedom, justice, lawfulness, safety, and peaceful public order were much more important than any specific ‘tribal/ethnic’ tradition or specific doctrine.   They stressed the Constitutional separation of powers in government, and made a sharp distinction between the public and the private spheres.  The exclusion of specific belief systems from the public sphere, they thought, would help to pacify conflicts of power, beliefs and interests.  James Madison, for example in the Federalist Papers, argued that civic peace and the common good would be better served by greater diversity of religions and interests, not by less.    

It was the revolutionary Founders who shaped America’s civic core, consisting of the ideas of tolerance and democracy, enabling people of different religious faiths and ethnic origins to bind themselves into one federation with a republican system of government. But, it was Abraham Lincoln, about six decades later, who stressed the need for cultivating a religious devotion to democracy and the need for a “political religion” that transcended sectarianism.  To quote from Lincoln’s famous Lyceum speech (3): 

“Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American mother, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap -- let it be taught in schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; -- let it be written in Primmers, spelling books and in Almanacs; -- let it be preached from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in courts of justice.  And, in short, let it become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars.”  

Beyond his rhetorical flourish (with a mid-19th century flavor) one can see that Lincoln understood the need for a secular religion, called “democracy”, to hold a trans-ethnic nation together.  His call for a ‘religious’ devotion was rooted in the need for citizens to put liberty, equality, justice and civic order/peace above other principles of sectarian religions and/or interests.  

It would be a mistake to think that this American civic or civil religion came instantaneously into being. Rather, it evolved slowly and grew over time.  For example, the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag was composed in the late nineteenth century, and became only a daily morning ritual in the public schools in the early twentieth century.   It is also undeniable that the ‘American creed’ has been the subject of constant or permanent vigorous internal debate, between what may be called (a) the open-ended formalists and (b) the preservers of tradition. This split, which today is clearly visible at the Supreme Court, for example, corresponds broadly to the contemporary distinction (in the American  context)  between liberals and conservatives, but this is not to imply that every serious person concerned could necessarily be so easily pigeon-holed.      

Patriotic liberals (we are not concerned here with unpatriotic ones) tend to argue that America’s political religion consists of a formal political/legal structure of ethical principles, one that is sustained by core laws and a common language, but also one that remains open to constant changes of content in these laws.  The well-known political philosopher John Rawls was a major exponent of this view in modern times.  On the other side, conservatives take a less formalistic but more substantive view.  Beyond the formal structure, they care about tradition and about stability in the content of the law(s).  Some of them, like Samuel Huntington did in his last book (4), appear to equate this narrowly with the Anglo-protestant tradition.  There are no doubt powerful arguments on either side of this long-running debate, and it is quite possible to be equally disturbed by Rawls’s apparent “Enlightenment universalism” as by Huntington’s apparent tribal/ethnic interpretation of content.       

There is little doubt that the republican ideals - of equality (before the law) and of accountability of political leaders to the people - evolved out of a specifically British tradition.  But it would be wise, for both sides in this debate, to re-acquaint themselves with the Founders’ anti-sectarian ‘Deism’ and with Lincoln’s pleas for tolerance.   The American tradition stresses limits on the power of government, and separation between the public and private spheres.  The American civic religion is about a shared commitment or duty to liberty, equality, justice, and civic order.  And American patriotism requires that the citizens’ constitutional commitment to America is more ultimate than any theological or dogmatic commitment to any sectarian religion and/or ideology.  
 

Educational Implications

The American civic religion has come under great strain over the past half century, in large measure because of manifest failures in the public education system (especially at the elementary and secondary level) to transmit the values of “Jeffersonian democracy”.   The reasons are multiple, for sure, and some would argue that they can be traced back to ‘romantic’ educational theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau.  America’s public education system in the 20th century became dominated by educational theorists who rejected academic content in favor of “child-centered” and “how-to” learning methods that are at odds with how children really learn.

Abraham Lincoln’s Lyceum speech illustrates that he understood the need for transmission of a secular civic religion, called democracy, to hold together a trans-ethnic society.  Much of the contemporary education establishment no longer does.   However, genuine equality requires that anyone can enter the mainstream of society, and that requires in turn cultural literacy, i.e. a grasp or understanding of background information that writers and speakers assume their audience already has.  Take, for example, words like “Calvary, Gettysburg Address, carpetbagger, Waterloo, Alamo, tabula rasa, etc…  Such ‘literacy’ requires academic content in public education in the form of a common ‘core curriculum’.   These ideas have been expertly developed and defended by E. D. Hirsch (who recently retired as University Professor of Education and Humanities at the University of Virginia) in two books, which should be read by anyone directly concerned with education (and that includes all parents of young children).  To quote Hirsch:

“…a human group must have effective communications to function effectively, that effective communications require shared culture, and that shared culture requires transmission of specific information to children.” (5)             

Large and free trans-ethnic societies, in particular, need common ideals and shared knowledge.  It is ironic that the child-centered educational theories of the liberal education establishment, coupled with the identity politics (that emphasizes membership in sub-group over national participation) practiced by much of the political left, have actually helped to undermine their own professed goals of national solidarity and of individual equality.  But, there are clear signs of a reaction underway to the educational status-quo.  Educational diversity (in the form of public schools, private schools like charter schools and the like, home schooling etc…) is essential to ensure quality through competition, but at the same time a renewed emphasis on a common core curriculum (6) is required to build genuine citizenship in all young citizens.   Given the tolerant nature of the American civic religion, and given the eternal debate between open-ended formalists and preservers of tradition, it is crucial that (local) decisions about the common content in the early school curriculum accommodate both liberal and conservative views about American traditions.  
    
 
European Unification

It should be kept in mind that the United States of America, as a federal union, was borne out of a common struggle against the ‘tyranny’ of the British monarchy in the late 18th century, and that it came almost unglued in the middle of the 19th century during the civil war.  In contemporary Europe, the common ‘enemy’ is not less real, but certainly less visible.   Nevertheless, one can safely assume that attempts at further European unification will continue in the foreseeable future, in one way or another, under the pressure of geopolitical events.   Lasting success in that regard would require the development of a distinctive European civic religion which remains far from assured.   In that endeavor, Europeans could do far worse than committing themselves to the civic ideals of freedom, equality and toleration, which form the core of Jeffersonian democracy.  These ideals are not exactly congruent with the ‘spirit’ of the current European Union construct.  But, then, bear in mind that it took a long time for America’s civic core to develop and to be respected (in terms of ‘religious’ devotion).   

The most obvious major obstacles to European unification, or to a common European ‘nationhood’, are (a) the geographic concentration of various major ethnicities in Europe and (b) the absence of a common language.   Ethnic concentration makes it much harder for reason to trump emotion, and for common civic ideals to trump conflicting regional interests.   Perhaps, lessons can be learned from India as a very large democracy (with concentrated ethnicities), but India – as a democratic experiment – is historically still very recent or of short duration.

Commonality of language is an indispensable vehicle of loyalty and solidarity in large trans-ethnic societies.  This does not preclude the presence of many languages, but there must be a common language that all comprehend and use, and that is a vehicle to general ‘competence’ in the sense of understanding.   Some may point to Canada as a counter-example.  But, like India, the Canadian experiment as a sovereign nation is also of recent vintage, and on several occasions in the recent past came close to dissolving, although Canada’s geographic location is most fortuitous.   The Queen of England remains Canada’s Head of State, and the Canadian reality (like the Belgian one) is one of “deux solitudes”.   While none of us can predict the future, I contend that Canada’s linguistic duality will unavoidably limit its possibilities…

Real patriotism does not define itself by some difference from or superiority to some ‘other’, but rather by its loyalty to some ideal, by its willingness to sacrifice and even die for the patria, i.e. by its civic religion.   George Washington, after his military victory, against all expectations, did not become the ‘de facto king of America’, but returned to his farm.

“Amor patria (love of country) does not differ…from other affections in which there is always an element of fond imagining…”(7).   

 
 
 
 
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(*)  While the term “religion” historically and commonly refers to “the service and worship of God or the supernatural” (Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary), in line with some other definitions of more recent vintage the term “religion” will be used here in the sense of  “a cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to with ardor and faith”.

(1)  G. K. Chesterton, What I saw in America, New York: Dodd, Mead, 1923.    

(2) Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, 1781 (ed. Merrill D. Petersen, NY, Library of America, 1984).  

(3)  Address before the Young Men’s Lyceum, Springfield, Illinois, January 27, 1838, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, vol.1, ed. Roy Basler et al. (Rutgers University Press, 1953).

(4)  Samuel P. Huntington, Who are we? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004.  

(5)  From the foreword in E.D. Hirsch, JR, Cultural Literacy, Houghton Mifflin, 1983.

(6)  A detailed outline of such a core curriculum can be found in E.D. Hirsch, JR, The Making of Americans, Democracy and Our Schools, Yale University Press, 2009, Appendix 1.    

(7) Benedict Andersen, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (New York: Verso, 1991).

civic religion

That’s a hell of a text you’ve written there mister Huybrechts. You managed to make me a religious person. A civic-religious person that is… J

Civic religion # 6

@ Kapitein Andre

1) Indeed, history is replete with examples of "multi-ethnic" states that have fragmented and/or been destroyed.  The essential reason for that was the inability to move from "multi-ethnicity" to "trans-ethnicity".  But:

-- First, history is also replete with examples of states that moved from multi-ethnicity to their own 'new' ethnicity.  For example, we may consider the French today as a major European ethnic group, but you know that France was 'built' on many earlier ethnicities, some of which still survive in certain ways to this very day (although we should not take the claims of our former 'friend Armor' too seriously). It is probably also true that, in the past, trans-ethnicity (or new ethnicity) was usually obtained or established as the result of coercion and much violence over a very long period. Take for example the integration/transformation of Saxons, Normans and assorted others into 'English'. One would hope that in the future new ethnicity would be more often based on sensible rational 'civic religion' rather than on force and violence. And geography will always remain an immutable 'fact' or given.

-- Second, history is also replete with examples of "ethnic nations" that have NOT survived. To use some contemporary examples, if you think that Tibet will survive, or that the Kurds will ever have their own "ethnic nation", or the Flemish for that matter, then you must be an optimist.

So, the empirical evidence on 'viability' is mixed, at best. I repeat, while your preference for ethnic purity is clear, it is not of much use to people living in multi-ethnic societies (and that includes most people in Western civilisation today). These people need to concentrate on the quality of their civic religion(s).

2) The subject of ww2 is tangential at best to the subject at hand, and need not be discussed further at length. Of course, 'civic religion' plays an important role in the willingness of any DEMOCRATIC polity to fight a major and long war in distant lands. The unwilligness of most contemporary European 'polities' to confront a nuclear Iran or to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq is directly related to the nature of their civic religions. I am not discussing the pros and cons of these attitudes. It is simply common sense to state that in democracies, where the public influences the 'rulers', that civic religion is an essential ingredient for sustaining the state's involvement in events like ww2. The quality of American soldiers, or the marginal involvement of a "Brazilian division" in ww2, are trivial matters by comparison.

3) We agree that contemporary socialism is a very serious threat to national identity. But, there have been many variants of socialism, and the problematic one has little to do with actual workers but everything to do with academics and media elites.

4) I certainly agree that "traitors" should be dealt with "harshly". Whether "more harshly than enemies", depends on the particular enemy. I am not so sure whether we could agree on the process to determine who is an actual "traitor" in a democratic environment, and I have no interest in ethnic homogeneity for its own sake. I do not contest your description of the importance of the nuclear family, of the clan, of the ethnic group etc....But, all these must be seen as 'instruments' to serve a greater goal or good, i.e. the goal of developing the INDIVIDUAL's God-given talents and liberty. When these 'instruments' or sociological institutions do not perform that function they do not deserve my support, nor yours.

Civic Religion 5

Dear Marc Huybrechts,

 

Firstly, I fully agree that civic nationalism is necessary for the continuity of multi–ethnic societies.  However, I disagree that multi–ethnic societies are viable in the long term, even the United States.  Nation–states based on ethnic nationalism tend to be more stable in that ethnic nations can survive the destruction of the state.  From a long–term historical perspective, one can observe the many multi–ethnic states that have been fragmented by revolution or war, and the many ethnic nations that have survived to form states despite all attempts at destruction e.g. forced assimilation, deracination, and genocide.

 

Secondly, I also agree that the entry of the United States into World War II was decisive.  However, I disagree that any American “civic religion” played a role here.  Both Great Britain and the United States were pacifist until attacked by the Axis Powers, after which both they developed a warlike attitude and became determined to achieve victory at all costs.  American soldiers were neither the most effective nor the most spirited of the Allied forces, and Stalin’s machinations should not detract from the contribution of the Red Army.  Incidentally, a Brazilian division did fight German forces on the Italian Front.

 

Thirdly, socialism is a very serious threat to national identity.  Although it is preferable for nationalism to be bottom–up rather than top–down, the state and other instutions (e.g. religious organizations) are often necessary to develop and advance national identity.  The “state of nature” described in social contract theories focuses on the individual and ignores the family.  Families are the units that coalesce into larger clans or tribes and finally nations, and families contain hierarchies with the parents – often the father – at the top, with the authority and power to socialize their children into norms, etc.  If the nation is an extension of the family, than national institutions are necessary to lead the nation.  Of course, this leadership must be democratic, liberal and restricted.

 

Evidently, we differ on many points.  However, I trust that you will agree on the importance of treating traitors more harshly than enemies.  I say this because those politicians, bureaucrats and academics who placed the West in grave peril must be brought to account.  With your historical knowledge, you can understand my concern that these traitors be identified as such rather than be permitted to change allegiances and end up on the victorious side – ours.

Civic religion # 4

@ Kapitein Andre

1) I do not per se disagree with much of what you wrote in your first paragraph, but find it pretty much besides the point of my major contention, i.e. that trans-ethnic societies need a civic religion to thrive and survive.  It is fine for you to write that "ethnic nationalism is preferable" - you are entitled to your own preferences - but that is of no use to people living in trans-ethnic societies.  It is also questionable to claim, as you do, that "civic nationalism is not viable".  If you mean by that, for instance, that Chinese culture is much older than Brazilian culture, you would be right. But, so what? That certainly does not mean that a typical Brazilian would be worse off than a typical Chinese. I certainly hope that you do not judge individuals purely by their age, but rather by the 'content of their character'. You should do the same for political systems. Fact is that the civic religion of the American Founding Fathers, as embodied in the US Constitution, has stood the test of time for over two hundred years. This can not be said of the French and German 'polities', which should give you pause about the dangers of "ethnic nationalism". Personal preferences are one thing, historically observable facts are quite another.

2) At least we agree that "the German soldiers were the best per capita" in ww2. However, I did not introduce ww2 in order to express an opinion about the relative contribution of various countries in defeating nazi-Germany. I introduced it as an illustration of the importance of civic religion as a motivating factor to stand up to tyranny in geopolitics. The Russians were fighting on their land against an invader, and had their own designs on their neighbors. Unlike the Americans, there were no Brazilians, or Argentinians, or Zulus or whatever...fighting against Hitlers' disciplined hordes. Moreover, when it comes to relative contribution, you conveniently forget that the USA fought BOTH Hitler in Europe and imperial Japan in Asia. The Russians did not. And it might be instructive to look at a world map and compare the battlefield in Eastern Europe with the Pacific theatre. In short, your second paragraph was besides the point too, but you did (unwittingly, with your "stalemate") confirm my contention that any American unwillingness to fight in Europe would have resulted in a condominium of Hitler and Stalin over Europe.

3) I don't see how your third paragraph undermines my contention on the need for preserving America's civic religion. Your claim of a federation of states that have little in common is fanciful and certainly not informed by observation. I am not an expert on the commonality between the major British components or on the German Laender, but the claim that there would be less commonality between, say New Hampshire and New York, than between Bavaria and Hesse, strikes me as truly ridiculous. The case of the Swiss cantons is an interesting one, that you raised, because there we have different but concentrated ethnicities (with different languages!). I contend that the Swiss do have a 'civic religion', which clearly transcends ethnic homogeneity and which they eventually may loose under pressure from the undemocratic European Union. Switzerland confirms my major contention about the need for a civic religion, but it also provides a rare counter-example to my contention about the need for a common language to help sustain a common civic religion. But then, it is a small country...

Ideally, a nation's unity should not depend on being "led by the state" (you mean the federal state!) but by its people. That is why I wrote that the American civic religion and democracy are closely intertwined. You can not have one without the other. And, yes, the contemporary 'cultural' assault by the socialist left poses a severe threat to the American 'civic religion' and hence, in the end, to democracy and to the American union. As such, it poses a threat to freedom of Europeans too, but only those Europeans who know history will be able to recognise that.

Civic Religion 3

Dear Marc Huybrechts,

 

I maintain that civic nationalism is not viable in the long term, and that ethnic nationalism is preferable. Civic nationalism is not revolutionary; on the contrary it is a reaction to diversity. This is not unlike the change in immigration and integration policies from assimilation to multiculturalism, precipitated by immigrants from societies too diverse to assimilate into mainstream societies that were themselves relatively embryonic. Of course, it is politically correct today to believe that the settler societies of the New World were intended to accommodate every ethnicity, religion, culture and language. In fact, the New World was where Europeans who wanted to live according to the principles of the Enlightenment could do so with greater socio–economic opportunities than possible in Europe. Arguably civic nationalism in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand emerged due to participation in the World Wars. The World Wars prompted the Dominions to full autonomy, and ushered in the establishment of the professional standing US armed forces.

 

I find that your opinions on the Second World War and the Cold War are informed not by facts and reason but by your affinity for the United States and frustration with Western Europe and Belgium in particular. Germany was defeated mainly by the Soviet Union, not the United States. Also, you seem to forget the vast contribution of the British Commonwealth. German soldiers were the best per capita, but Germany could never compete economically with the United States and the Soviet Union. Even the industrial capacity of the Commonwealth alone demanded that Great Britain be defeated as quickly as possible. Moreover, had the United States not entered the war against Germany, stalemate would have resulted in Europe, with German and Soviet forces fighting insurgency as much as each other, and Great Britain reprising its Napoleonic strategy.

 

The United States is a federation of states, with much less in common than either the constituent nations of the United Kingdom or the cantons of the Swiss Confederation. I do not see the United States as a nation as such, despite the intense patriotism of many Americans. The United States requires more stability if nation–building is to work. Unfortunately for your notion of “civic religion”, American unity is led by the state, and the state will only have to grow stronger to tackle the centrifugal forces of diversity.

Civic religion # 2

@ Kapitein Andre

Thank you for offering your predictable negative opinion.  It is precisely the specific kind-of-nationalism of America's civic religion that created the American attractions of "liberty and opportunity", and it is precisely that same civic nationalism that enabled the USA to beat back the superb armies of ethnically-obsessed nazi-Germany and also to outlast and face down the Soviet Union threat of 'international communism'. America's civic nationalism and democracy are closely intertwined, and it is quite possible that neither will survive.  They must be 'tended', and every generation must renew its commitment if both are to survive. 

Like you, I "believe in greater state autonomy", at least compared with the present dispensation. It is no coincidence that the decline in America's civic religion over the past generation went hand in hand with increased socialistic concentration of power in Washington. But, unlike you, this desire for greater state autonomy should be rooted in the Founding Fathers' fear of concentration of power, i.e. in proper civic nationalism, and not in any ethnic 'illusions'.

I urge you to follow reason and empirical observation, not sentimental emotion. If America consisted of 50 different states with their own separate cultures, Europe would be ruled today by a condominium of Hitler's and Stalin's sicophants. Those supposedly "Irish Bostonians" are today governed by an African American Governor of Massachussetts (not to mention the federal 'guy' in Washington). And those supposedly "Mexican Americans in San Diego" are today governed by a jewish mayor and an 'Austrian' Governor of California (with an improbably-strong German accent). A manifestly trans-etnic society cannot live or survive without a civic religion.

On America's Civic "Religion"

I disagree that American society is "trans-ethnic" or that civic nationalism is viable.  The attractions of the United States were liberty and opportunity, and differing ideals and knowledge were very pronounced at America's founding, and remain so today.

 

The United States is a federation of states, and I believe in greater state autonomy.  I believe in each state fostering its own culture rather than in the fool's errand of civic nationalism that appeals to Irish-Americans in Boston as much as Mexican-Americans in San Diego. 

Context, indeed

@ Atheling

The article is about the civic or political worldview of the American Founding Fathers.  As far as I know they did not (yet) use the term "religion" in the political or civic sense.  They were concerned with political organisation.  The context here is not one of personal morality of any person. Naturally,when it comes to his personal morality, we may reasonably assume that to Jefferson his personal theology was more important to him than his legs or pocket.  

The tolerant 'Deism' of the Founders simply means, as you say, "that Americans must be tolerant of those who hold theological doctrines different from their own". But, the implication is also that when citizens differ about specific concrete issues or problems that the democratic procedures and constitutional provisions must be followed in settling these matters. It is, indeed, not government's role "to determine theology". But it is government's role to make the laws and to settle differences of opinion among citizens peacefully or democratically. That is ultimately a matter of "civic ethics" and not a matter of any particular theology or 'state religion'.

In a free and democratic society it is only the citizens, through their constitutional provisions or 'institutions', who can in practice decide what are "the legitimate powers of government" and what may be considered "injurious to others" and what not. It is only natural, or to be expected, that citizens will have different opinions about such matters. In terms of governance, those differences can only be settled (not permanently!) through the constitutional process, and not in your mind nor my mind alone. However, it is important to recognize that the citizens opinions' should ideally be informed by their sincerely-held theological beliefs. In a genuine democracy, you cannot dictate to others on such matters. You can only appeal to reason and to morality in order to achieve the 'best' compromise possible.

As usual, Marc Huybrechts

As usual, Marc Huybrechts has offered us cogent words on an important topic: civic religion. Huybrechts’ observation that Washington and Jefferson observed a deliberately contentless form of Deism is especially apt in calling our attention to the wisdom of the Founders. Non-specific ideas arouse contrary passions hardly at all. Insofar then as contentless Deism was the de facto civic religion of the early republic, this dispensation effectively removed religion from the domain of national politics. The First Amendment made the arrangement specific by locating the legitimacy of convictions in the private conscience of individuals.

Abraham Lincoln was an odd bird – a very different type from the Virginia Gentleman, closer, I would argue, to the Puritan theocrats than to the authors of the Constitution. Under Unitarian and Transcendentalist influence, Lincoln indeed in his rhetoric seems to be concocting and proselytizing for a national creed or civic cult. This cult differs strikingly from the contentless Deism of Washington and Jefferson precisely in having a more or less specific content. It also differs from “Federalist Deism,” as we might call it, in being a positive or “centripetal” creed rather than a neutral or “centrifugal” one. In other words, Federalist Deism defers religion from the political center whereas Lincoln’s syncretism of Emersonian motifs and revolutionary abstractions like “equality” actually ensconces religion in the political center.

One consequence of ensconcing a positive creed in the political center and exerting pressure on people, through what amounts to propaganda, to espouse that creed is that the government, as the advocate of a kind of faith, is itself now in direct religious competition with other faiths. Another way of putting it is to say that the government, in tying itself to a faith, now stands in rivalry to millions of private consciences. This development – which it is accurate to tie to Lincoln – clearly violates the wisdom of the founding, Constitutional arrangement. Again, it resembles (and not so distantly) the theocratic structure of the Massachusetts colony. One’s gut-feeling that in formulating and advocating a positive national cult Lincoln and his Republican followers had introduced a disturbing deformation into the polity is born out by the immediate consequence of the man’s election.

Huybrechts, speaking mainly of religiosity, points out many differences between the United States from the era of its establishment right through to the contemporary present and the various European nations. I too am speaking of religion when I add another item to that list of differences. The European nations all solved the moral (and therefore also the religious) problem of slavery without descending into fratricidal conflict; they did it peaceably by parliamentary procedure – which had been the trend in the USA since the Eighteenth Century. John Brown, like Lincoln, was an intensely religious man, a dangerously religious man. Lincoln – as long years of contemplation have persuaded me – was religious in the same way as Brown. Lincoln’s creed, like Brown’s creed, carried a strong tincture of the apocalyptic.

The American civic religion, established by Lincoln, has preserved its Lincolnesque character ever since – and indeed has grown more positive and insistent in the ensuing centuries and decades. I agree with Huybrechts that a nation needs a religion (from the Latin religare, “to bind or tie”), but when the nation, or an image of it, becomes the religion – or worse yet when the government becomes the object of devotion – then the project has, so to speak, gone off the rails.

Civic religion #7

One can only feel trepidation before attempting to participate in a discussion on the level of learning and insight as the present one. With respect to the main theme, I would suggest that what marcfrans calls American civic religion, expressed in the ideals of Jeffersonian democracy--liberty, equality, property, self-government, self-reliance, and republican virtue--is also a proxy for identification and cooperation with the WASP settlers and their institutions, customs, folkways, and aspirations. The express ideals are the shared symbols, but the shared reality the symbols stand for is not only the cognitive content of the symbols, but the shared life of the people in work, commerce, marriage, property management, and civic participation in church, government, schools, and NGOs like the PTA, Boy Scouts, Indian Guides, Elks, Moose, Odd Fellows, Optimists, Toastmasters, Sertoma, Knights of Columbus, Kiwanis, Rotary, etc., etc. In short, "liberty" is not liberty in general, but "our liberty."

A trick of the left is to take the shared symbol and shove meanings into it that are foreign to the life of the people. For example, take multiculturalism. Ideals of freedom and equality are enlisted to cut out the very heart of the civic religion, the "substance" of the shared life the spoken ideals symbolize. The "prejudices" of a people are part of their shared life, which the express ideals have the job of protecting, not destroying. Ethnicity in America is part of the shared life. When it is thematized in opposition to the shared life, it becomes destructive. (Arguably, whiteness was an express, thematized ideal of Jeffersonian democracy. Query whether we made a bigger mistake uttering that ideal, or silencing it.) Then the effort is made to void the express symbols of their unspoken content in order to make them universal, with the result that they become denatured and alien. Then you are creating the "proposition nation" that conservatives detest. Thus, I would qualify marcfrans' thesis by suggesting that the American civic religion includes the infinite texture of "Burkean" custom, the fabric of the shared life of a people.

Prof. Bertonneau's speculations on Lincoln struck me, I must say, like a lightning bolt that cast its vibrating glare on the awful mystery of our Civil War. It seemed to explain why millions of men were willing to kill and die for the preservation of the nation as they understood it--a fact which needs a more persuasive explanation than disagreement over slavery, especially in the hindsight provided by the failure of desegregation and the failure of black Americans to thrive in liberty. One might almost say that WASP America slew itself on the battlefields of the North-South War. And why? Because neither the Virginia Gentleman (and his less opulent cousins) nor the Massachusetts Puritan (and his) could tolerate domination by the other. Prof. Bertonneau's notion of Lincoln explains the rooted hatred of old-fashioned Southerners (if any remain) and so-called paleo-conservatives for Father Abraham, who from almost any other perspective is one of the greatest and most lovable men who ever lived. For such, Lincoln is no better than Dante's Mohammed, eternally damned for splitting the Lord's Church. Lincoln, in their view, destroyed the unity of America by destroying and invading the neutrality of the sacred center and erecting a new idol--not only the Yankee Leviathan of overreaching government in the service of the plutocracy, but a new religion that displaced the "civic religion" of government neutrality towards religion.

(Here I will introduce a small quibble. The First Amendment only prohibited the establishment of religion by the federal government. It permitted the states to maintain established churches. Thus it was not private conscience, but the conscience of the people of a state, i.e., a former self-governing colony, that was the constitutional vessel of religious liberty. The quibble is small because the development of religious individualism did away with state establishments through state legislation within two generations, and eventually the incorporation doctrine (an unconstitutional monstrosity accepted as perfectly natural by generations of lawyers and citizens) applied the First Amendment to the states.)

Civic religion #7 bis

What kind of idol did Lincoln erect, so offensive to Virginia Gentlemen? A strange one--for what could be closer to the neutrality of the empty center than the nearly contentless universalism of Unitarianism and Transcendentalism? Yet the universality of their content should not distract us from their deliberate violence towards traditional doctrines and forms of organization. The universalism of those "faiths" does not vacate the center and let be whatever stands around the periphery, but reaches out from the center to cast down any idols in sight. Hence the invasion and wasting of the South. Hence the "apocalyptic" strain Prof. Bertonneau identifies.

As a descendant of colonial Massachusetts, I welcome this explanation for the crusading power of the North in the above-referenced war, and the ability to take such dire casualties and dish out such fratricidal punishment. It also explains the inability of Northern "civic religion" to stabilize in a livable order, but rather to continually revolutionize every aspect of American society until nothing is left standing. "We Northerners," if I may speak so, thought we were preserving our lives and liberty by preventing the spread of the "slave power" throughout the West. But instead we purchased our own slavery by unleashing the destructive power of the new god. The family, the white race, the Christian religion, the Constitution, the American identity, literacy, the dollar--all dissolve in the acid of neutral, contentless, yet all-destroying revolutionary fervor in the service of the Northern "civic religion," which turns out to be nothing else than liberalism. If any idea, ideal, or institution, etc., does not adopt revolutionary egalitarianism as its foundation and guide, it is stamped with every badge of opprobrium. By way of excuse, I can only say that it was not inherent to the Massachusetts Puritan to impose his religion on others outside his self-governing community. John Adams, for example, would not have launched a crusade to impose his dear religion, though he might have gone to war, eventually, to preserve the Union.

To sum up, Prof. Bertonneau's insight that the Civil War was a religious war explains its suicidal destructiveness. What a pity if the greatest, most beloved American president turned out to be the apostle of revolutionary liberalism!

@SteveP55419

It's not democracy which is flawed.  When the people are misinformed or ignorant, then their democracy fumbles.  The system is only as good as those who operate it.

Context, Context, Context

Let's put that Jefferson quote in context:

"The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." Notes on Virginia, 1782.

He is speaking of legitimate powers of government, not of the importance of civic ethics over theological doctrine! He is not saying that his legs and his pocket are "more important" than theological doctrine, but that government has no role in determining theological doctrine, and that Americans must be tolerant of those who hold theological doctrines different from their own. This quote is about the right of those to hold opinions that may contradict others, and that government action may not be taken against them!

Context and Intent @atheling

You are quite right to insist on the context of Jefferson's statement. Civic ethics do not trump the theological. Jefferson surely meant that government may not interfere with individual religious views. However, the context also strongly implies he saw it as a legitimate power of government to intervene whenever a religion clearly aims either to pick our pocket or break our leg, and to bring the full force of civil law against any neighbor who preaches such.

@Garthe Kindler

Regarding your last point:

"It is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere [in the propagation of religious teachings] when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order." --Thomas Jefferson: Statute for Religious Freedom, 1779. ME 2:302, Papers 2:546

and,

"If anything pass in a religious meeting seditiously and contrary to the public peace, let it be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market." --Thomas Jefferson: Notes on Religion, 1776. Papers 1:548

You are quite right.

Abortion

The thought that kept recurring as I read this essay is that democracy is an experiment not an ultimate good and, if this is true, the idea of a civic religion is not really valid even if Lincoln did propose it. So here we have millions and millions of unborn children who have been killed within the working framework of a democracy. As one who knows in his bones that those little ones were human, I conclude that either democracy is not actually working as it should or democracy has finally shown itself to have been a flawed idea. If the latter is the case, we need not be discouraged. The business of ordering human affairs has to do with striving for the good, the beautiful and the true. When a system, however elegant, that started out along these lines leads to mass murder, we need to question it, not the eternal verities.