About selective judgment of whether sanctions work. Nuptials in Moscow: Allah’s Brides find the Real One. Being willing to see what there is and then acting upon it.

1.You are in for a surprise if you recall the divergent versions of what has been advocated by the same people about “sanctions” to be applied to discipline derelict regimes.

In the course of the last decades, we have heard a lot about the desirability and effectiveness of punitive measures short of war. It is obviously possible to have opposing opinions regarding whether sanctions work or not and if they should be applied against a certain country or should to be shelved. Neither the “yes” not the “no” position is completely without merit. By itself, the “withdrawal of international love” will hardly overthrow a system we want to punish or pressure. Sanctions – economic, diplomatic, and cultural – do not have the decisive effect of the guillotine when used to chop off heads.

Contrary to their earlier positions regarding the then outstanding cases, it is now generally inappropriate, in the eyes of some opinion makers, to advocate sanctions. Somehow, one is led to suspect that not the effectiveness of the measure might explain the reservations. Our day’s primary sanction target is Iran and North Korea. (China should be on the list but she forbids that.) Now, those that went wild for sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa, etc. tell us that this cannot and does not work. If in a theoretical exercise Israel comes up, the same people seem to forget about their reservations. There are ways to explain the apparent inconsistency and to detect a consistency.

Some considerations speak for or against sanctions. The legitimate determinant is the national interest and the judgment of the policy that could be the reason to pronounce sanctions. The target of punitive isolation can be to the liking of the judge or an object of his antipathy. On that basis, it is justified to advocate the application of sanctions or that they must not be imposed. Legitimately, the purpose that admittedly reflects values, favors tailored-for-the-case approaches to specific countries. With respect to friendly systems or efforts considered just, it is legitimate to be supportive. The contrary is also a legitimate stance. In the concrete case of sanctions, open approval or disapproval translates into wanting to help or intending to hinder. Sanctions, applied, threatened or prevented, serve as a legitimate instrument to assert the interest of states or movements.

In the case of those that argue that sanctions in Iran’s case should not be imposed because they are ineffective, seem to signal some inconsistency. For one thing, the same people are likely to have professed earlier that sanctions against other systems need to be applied. It also seems remarkable that much political energy is invested in the prevention of a measure that is supposedly ineffective. Why fight it if it makes no difference? In the case of circles that argue against sanctions in concrete cases, a notable correlation becomes apparent. It often happens that the claim of no effect is paired with a practice that violates sanctions. The more effective sanctions are the greater the profit for their violators. This breach fills a demand created by enterprises that retreat from sanctioned markets. In this case sanctions are of reduced effect because the party that makes the claim sees to it that, for its own profit, it be so.

Sanctions against systems that are secretly favored by those that formally question the proposed sanctions claim that the pressure radicalizes its target. This is obviously true because those to be restrained by isolation will dislike efforts to limit them. Failing sanctions, or sanctions that are not fully applied, can radicalize only those that are already radical. Failing, or disproportionally under-sized reaction to misdeeds will convince international law-breakers that the victim and its supporters do not or cannot defend themselves. This impotence encourages because it suggests that, the risks of confrontations are negligible while its gains grow. Confirming the radicals’ policy by allowing it to be successful will encourage the crocodile to snap more often and to go for more meat. Moderation will certainly not be the upshot of reactive restraint.

“Getting away” with it emboldens the impostor. It also strengthens him because nothing succeeds like success and nothing legitimizes more convincingly than gainfully completed crime.

This leaves us with a choice. What is better, a criminal régime that is “weakened but angry” or one that is “stronger and therefore more aggressive”?

 

2. This morning’s news informs us that two explosions have disrupted Moscow’s “metro”. Islamic fundamentalists have finally found a limited use for women. Accordingly, “Allah’s Brides” have celebrated their nuptials with a big bang. The attack has an odd feature. Next to China, Russia happens to be the main force that blocks in the UN the under-sized counter-measures meant to warn Iran that its nuclearization is intolerable. The illusion that, immunity can be purchased by ignoring terrorism if directed against the West in general and the US specifically, might be a casualty of the blasts. So is the delusion that by looking the other way a state can purchase neutrality in the war the Islamists wage against the achievements of the last millennium. The other idea for the dustbin is that whatever is bad for the USA is necessarily of some use to a Russia resenting the outcome of the Cold War.

Past and present terrorist regimes suffer from a self-induced delusion that is to the ultimate advantage of their often-clumsy foes. Their initial successes, scored when they are underrated and their goals are not understood, inebriate them. Emboldened by scoring against the low-key resistance of a dozing enemy, they create tremors that wake their designated victims. The error of making the unaware dupe rise tends to be rounded out. Spectacular attacks force short-term allies, whose cooperation is a prerequisite of success, to detect the pattern and to change course. Russia’s future global –and regional- policy regarding Islamism might confirm the generalization. The time is coming when Moscow will have learned a lesson. One cannot effectively fight locally what one indirectly supports globally so as to damage a competitor. It is risky to cuddle abroad what likes to kill you at home.

 

3. As implied above, the realistic reaction of states and their leaders to the threats of their time needs to be presented as a conditional. Clear-cut cases and inescapably logical conclusions drawn from them would have to be the rule if this would be a rational world. If this would hold true then the record, whether called “history” or “current affairs” would have contours that are hardly reminiscent of past and current reality.

When Hitler’s surprise attack nearly destroyed the Soviet Union in 1941, the blow was anything but a surprise to anyone. The Great Leader excepted. Stalin had the facts but lacked the understanding to act upon them. After all, was it in Hitler’s interest to wage a two-front war? The “early Bush” tried diplomacy in Iraq and then made a discovery. If the criteria for concessions were “something for a little bit of anything,” then this failed. Concessions offered brought little in return. To the “other guy” the inducements appeared to be capitulations rooted in weakness or lack of spine. Saddam alone benefited from the process by gaining time. To the extent that time could be gained through postponement, the risks of the approaching confrontation grew. Obama is also betting his future on cutting the Gordian knot by diplomacy. So far the results are comparable to Bush’. The difference is that at this time it seems that this bothers Obama less than it did Bush when “W” changed his approach.