The Age Of Ideology

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Progressive secularism and moderate Islam. Extortion called bail. Human nature, equality and those in charge of leveling.
 
1. Its phrasing did not quite reveal why Turkey’s vote, on September 12, had a significance that transcended the affairs of that often ignored country. Even if it is not quite PC to talk about it, the vote has implications. On top of the list stands the European Union which, under the pressure of the indigenous Left and the USA, is being nudged to accept Turkey as a member. Of greater significance is what the results tell about the prospects and stability of states intending to be secular democracies that happen to have a Muslim population. Beyond that, crucial scenarios regarding the future of the Caucasus-Black Sea and Caspian regions are affected by the decision.

On the surface, the Turks had to decide the fate of a new constitution. Officially, the case put forward had democratic plating. The new basic law was to replace the one that the soldiers, which ran the country in the 1980s, had imposed. According to the draft, the military’s privileged position in politics is to be reduced. Furthermore, the judicial system’s personnel become dependent of parliament. That body is to determine the appointment of judges and it is the legislature that will make the appointments to the enlarged constitutional court of the country.

In fact, if one considers motives and hidden agendas, the matter is more opaque than the foregoing would suggest. Much is concealed behind the plucking of the military’s feathers. The same applies to the new, legislature-appointed composition of the highest court that is there to protect the modern system.

Whatever the reader’s views regarding politics made by soldiers, and the judiciary’s independence might be: not only abstract principles but also local conditions should be considered. The founder of modern Turkey was an officer. In Atatürk’s analysis, backward institutions, a matching culture, and the corresponding way of life were the cause of the country’s weakness in 1918. These burdening characteristics he saw as being rooted in Islam. (The deposed Sultans were also heading the state religion.) Therefore, Atatürk’s new Turkey became laicistic to the extent that it strived for modernity. Accordingly, the break with the past by privatizing religion was to facilitate modernization. In charge of this new way was the military whose officers had a relatively modern education.

Erdogan and his party claim to be representatives of moderate Islam. As such, his party nibbled away some of Atatürk’s reforms. In the vote, the real and unstated issue was the choice between an open turn to Islam and the retention of a secular system. Therefore, the advanced areas of Turkey voted “no” on the constitution and thereby registered a “yes” in favor of continued modernization.

The new constitution’s support –and the nod in favor of Islamism- came from the backward provinces. Time will demonstrate whether the professing moderates, especially if the country is not admitted to the European Union, will continue to drift along the Prophet’s path. If so, the early signs that confirm that Islam and modernity do not mix well will gain emphasis. Washington and Brussels congratulate Ankara to “the minarets are our missiles” Erdogan’s victory. This official enthusiasm might represent a disconnect with the facts on the ground.

2. Finally, Iran has released a female member of the trio that foolishly decided to do some mountain climbing right on the Iranian border. Under murky circumstances they were captured –or is kidnapped the better word? The charge, following an old Soviet recipe, became espionage. The scheme must have been a devilishly shrewd one. The innocent observer detects at the venue of apprehension nothing except bare peaks. The adventure-seeking lady has been freed on bail. The Swiss - as neutrals they represent America in Tehran -  were raising and transferring the money. The bad, because precedent- confirming part of the story is that, the posting of bail does not conclude the story. The script that has been followed in this case too, makes those released on bail leave the country and forfeit the money. Therefore, the end of the story is not a happy end. And the bail is no bail but extortion.

3. Democratic individualists –adherents of progressive conservatism- hold that all men are equal in that they are different. These differences are nature given. As such, they are also a symptom of a quality that defines us as individuals and therefore as human beings. Flowing from these assumptions, the differences that define us personally are seen as constituting something precious. This is so to the extent that one of the primary purposes of government, and the duty of the governors, is to protect it. Therefore, a protected basic right is the right to be as different from others as we think it to be proper –as long as this does not diminish the basic rights of our piers. Putting it differently, the summary could be “as divergent as desired and as safe in that condition as possible.”

Here the modern bureaucracies that are dedicated to the enforcement of equality enter the picture. No state –whether limited or omnipresent- is possible without them. This poses a fundamental problem. Even if not in the service of a system committed primarily to leveling, the bureaucrat’s instinct is to apply the power that comes with his office and function. The task given to the bureaucrat is to handle all of us the same regardless of the differences that prevail between men. This means that he is encouraged to make all men alike so that they can be made equal. This is the point where individualism and equality, as imposed by the office in charge, clash. Often a component of this conflict is that our free will, our reason and the office’ standard order of procedures wind up at odds.

4. Equality imposed by government machinery has its quirks. Even if the same rules are applied to all, there will continue to be divergent outcomes. Some will thrive and others will fall behind. If compared to the spontaneous order of principled non-interference, all that will have changed is that success and failure, will to a considerable extent be the result of policy and parameters created by a bureaucracy. We can only guarantee identical achievement by equalizing all of us with the resulting unequal rights for all. In the practical execution of such projects, the price paid will be the privileged inequality of the applicators.

Do we wish to adjust to the challenge of a changing world and the conditions that it imposes upon us? Or do we opt for the protection from competitors that represent a response to a world in motion? It might be better to accept the risks inherent in competition than to opt in favor of the immunity from rivals because that will stifle all and favor the unproductive that are well connected to the engineers of our order.

5. Have the attempts to change the natural and organic course of human events been interrupted by actions that aim to change their direction? Apparently inchoate reality created uncertainties. These challenged our desire for the security that radiates out of the predictable. The response determined the modern era of our development.

We are inclined to want a simple explanation for a complex reality. Change makes not only the workings of the place where we are located physically hard to grasp. When we look around through our ever wider scanning binoculars, we discover that the little centers around which other local worlds churn, appear to operate according to divergent principles and that they do so in the pursuit of confusing ends. Modern times have extended the boundaries of the world of which we can be aware with our limited span of attention. Subjectively the world becomes larger because we see ever more of it. Not only has the extent of the field we are enabled to view grown. Subjects, earlier kept private have become, as the boulevard press proves, public. Our ancestors might have suffered from a lack of information. Today we have to protect ourselves from contradictory and unrelated data, which we are, due to its volume, unable to digest. Just think here of the pages in the Sunday paper you discard unread and the announced disaster you ignore in favor of your expected pet calamity.

Acting to regain our controlling comprehension over our surroundings, also to overcome the distractions of the age of complexity, we hunt for a simple formula that can bring order into the chaos. We are seeking something that restores visibility while we appear to submerge in pea soup. The result is the spread of utopias. Sometimes these take the form of traditional religion, most frequently they emerge as secular faiths based, as our prejudice demands, on something that looks like science. Accordingly, the age of multiplicity and complexity provoked the age of ideology.

I agree, eventually it comes

I agree, eventually it comes down to whether islamists can be something like the equivalent of christian democrats in Europe. In other words, whether a muslim country can remain democratic without the strict secularism the military guaranteed; which was an odd not-so-democratic situation in the first place.
As you rightly pointed out, the kemalists (the "Center-Left", sort of) are actually nationalists and statists -as was their leader and mentor, Ataturk. The islamists, on the other hand, are economically liberal but less nationalistic; it is under Erdogan that some reconciliatory breakthroughs have been made with the kurdish minority and even the christian communities in Turkey (at least what's left of them). The islamists propose a panislamic, neo-ottoman identity which would unite Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Bosnians, Kosovars etc., of course under leading turkish guidance and influence. Their current foreign minister, Davutoglou, has written an extensive book explaining his dogma, it's called "Strategic Depth", a must read for anyone wishing to understand what's going on with turkish foreign policy these days.
So, the question is not only whether the rural population that backs them accepts the western notion of democracy [there's also a new urban conservative class of businessmen who support them for their economic liberalism]. The question is also whether their grandiose quasi-imperial aspirations can be reconciled with the restraints of democratic institutions domestically.

The EU and the US, I don't know what they're thinking, I have really lost hope they can plan past the next elections. Turkey has now a vibrant population and economy and is playing her own regional game, so they might just find it best to jump on the turkish wagon and hope they will benefit too in some way.

Ataturk # 3

@ jack 55

No, I did not suspect you of misreading Erdogan's intentions, and I basically agree with your description of the ongoing struggle in Turkey between the 'old secular establishment' and the islamists.  I would only add that the old secular guard, or what you call "the militarists", was basically wedded to a nationalistic AND rather socialistic world view in the past. 

I already made my point about the need to link majority rule to respect for fundamental individual rights, if "democracy" is to be a meanigful concept. 

 An additional point concerns your use of the term "religious conservatives" who happen to be the majority in Turkey. The main relevant issue is not so much that these mostly rural folk are "religious conservatives", but rather that they do NOT share our conception of democracy as 'majority rule limited by respect for basic individual rights'. The essential problem is not that they are religious conservatives, but rather that they are nondemocrats.

Surely we agree that one cannot form a democracy with nondemocrats, or that one cannot expect democracy to flourish in a nondemocratic culture! The important question is whether the EU and the US government understand this. I doubt it very much.

marcfrans,

marcfrans,

I don't disagree with your observations, perhaps you thought that I believe Erdogan to be an honest warrior for modern democracy. Well, obviously he is far from that. His perspective is to pave the way for a permanent and unhindered dominance of his party; the majority of the population are religious conservatives, so under normal democratic function they should be dominant most of the time. It is just that the EU accession procedure helps him in this regard making him look like a moderniser too, while his opponents seem as supporters of an "ancient regime".
After all, had it not been for the iron fist of the military the islamists would have achieved this maybe 50 years ago, because they have indeed the majority in the society at large.

And certainly the real challenge will come soon after these institutional amendments: will the islamists, once they have won the main battles against the militarists and their supporters, be able to contain themseleves inside the framework of a modern democracy, with all its checks and balances and constitutional guarantees of individual rights etc.? That remains to be seen.

Ataturk # 2

@ jack55

I am less enthusiastic than Capodistrias about your analysis.  It lacks a proper definition or understanding of "fully democratic".  You seem to equate democracy with majority rule.  That often means mob rule.

Democracy must be seen as (temporary) majority rule in combination with constitutional guarantees for basic individual rights.  Democracy is meaningless unless the legislature respects (and the Supreme judicial body guarantees or defends) basic INDIVIDUAL rights.

For example, if Erdogan called "assimilation" a "crime", it should be obvious that he denies individual rights of Turks (and no doubt others) to decide about their own 'identity'. A simple way to expose Erdogan as a 'nondemocrat' would be to ask him if individual muslims (in Turkey or elsewhere) have a right to change their religion. His reponse would be fascinating to watch... Not that the EU or the current US government would notice though!

Well Ataturk may have been a

Well, Ataturk may have been a moderniser for Turkey but he was also, in effect, a dictator. Most of his modernising measures came contrary to popular will and were actually imposed on the religious masses. Since his death, the military played the role of the guardian of his legacy moving in with coups any time they thought it was endagered in some way, at almost regular 20-year intervals.
That's obviously not something you would call a healthy democratic tradition. Erdogan himself was prosecuted for "antisecular activities" while having been elected prime minister. In a sence, Kemalists resemble the european (and lately the american) leftists who would very much like to ban public religious activities and prosecute their political opponents for being "too religious".
So, there seems to be this paradox in Turkey: the supposedly progressive, modernised, secular minority is actually rooting for the continuation of the excessive power of the military and the judiciary over political life. While the supposedly backward, conservative, religious majority is supporting the dissolution of this power and a move towards true democratic institutions, as dictated by EU accession criteria.

Of course, on a realist approach from a european perspective, whether Turkey becomes fully democratic shouldn't be our concern (the case of Hamas in Gaza is rather telling). As said, Erdogan's islamists, though they like to pose as "moderates" and as such they are supported by EU and the US may not necessarily be so. Speaking to a turkish crowd in Germany, some years ago, he stated that "assimilation is a crime against humanity" and that they should maintain their national and religious identity at all costs. If Turkey is finally accepted in the EU, it is not a wild scenario that she will eventually come to act as a representative (and "protector") of all of Europe's muslims.

The Modern Bureaucrat

Mr. Handlery,

I always enjoy your columns. And I appreciate the way you play conductor and nimbly bring your musicians, i.e ideas, together. However, tonight, I think your bureaucrat section was a little flat. The corrupt bureaucrat, modern or ancien, will always make any bureaucracy's performance a little less predictable than the simple interpretation of the 'bureaucratic leveler.'