As the national state evolved in the 19th century, too much emphasis was placed on it as the expression of the alleged collective characteristics of its inhabitants and on its role as the protector of their economic well being. This nationalistically coloured view of the state (notice the implications for “Big Government”) goes against the ideals of classical liberalism. The implied Leviathan reduces the chances of resistance against the dictatorship of majorities as in “people’s democratic dictatorships.” Meanwhile the awareness has faded that freedom means the right to resist, in the name of individualism, in circumscribed areas and means, the organization that claims to embody the “general will.” Accordingly, nationalism assumed that the nation and its state were automatically democratic and that individual rights did not precede it but were its upshot. Much of the issues that conservatives in our time are concerned with have their roots in this original sin of modern-day political organization.

Beyond this conceptual weakness lurking in the genes of nationalist programs, the implementation of nationalism has often produced results that were substantially worse than the concept’s built-in theoretical blemishes. In many regions in Europe – where the “ism” was invented – and in numerous places around the globe to which the idea was exported in the 20th century, a disparity appeared, the disparity between the unitary national state planned for a territory and the actual ethnic make-up of its population. This posed a difficult task for an entity that intended to grant rights based on ethnic belonging. If the nation-state was to work by securing, beyond its sovereignty, also the liberty and the welfare of its inhabitants, then it had to assume ethnic homogeneity. In doing so, however, the nation-state could no longer be seen as a nation’s state.

Already in 1848 it became apparent that a conflict exists between historic claims to land and the rights of the ethnic groups populating it. The national state tended to be nationalistic, and therefore inclined to assert that it was the expression of the collective will of an ethnic group. Accordingly, its advocates felt committed to secure the rights of the “people of state.” Consequently, the rights of groups that had “sneaked” into “the mother land” after an often arbitrarily set past date, were implicitly curtailed. The unwillingness of these to assimilate (change identity) or to depart was intolerable. Accordingly, local self determination, even the expression of the cultural identity of these ethnic sores, met with rejection as it endangered “national unity.”

The successful case of Switzerland, with its “three-and-a-half nations” all with national homes across the border – in states that consistently fought each other – is an exception. Generally multi-national states were weakened by being poor, dictatorially ruled and correspondingly frustrated. The empires in this class (Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire) disintegrated on account of their composition.

In Europe the conflict between nationalistic demands projected against the clouds of imagination and the pits of ethnic reality on the ground, was most intense in central and eastern Europe. That was so because this central region had the kind of turbulent history that mixes people to the extent that their separation – in accordance with the notions of nationalists – became extremely difficult. A good case can be made that the world wars were consequences of the tensions created by competing and frustrated nationalisms unfolding in the context of unstable states whose enemy without was identical with the ethnic enemy within. Suffice it to say, as in the case of the recent – and not yet settled – conflicts evolving out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the indigenous populations have proved to be unable to find a solution characterized by stability, consensus and equity for all.

In 1919 the victorious (Western) Great Powers had a chance to overcome the danger emanating from thwarted nationalism. To their credit they at least perceived the problem. Nevertheless the peace, pontificated over by Woodrow Wilson – a worthy precursor of Jimmy Carter – and inspired by George Clemenceau, did everything to replace old dung heaps by new cesspools. Given the high expectations, the total dissatisfaction of all was greater than before the war. A great number of successor states were set up that either wanted more than they got or resented what they had lost. The new, often synthetic creations (chiefly by the grace of France) were as multi-ethnic as their predecessors – but less generous to their “alien” and suspected subjects. Therefore the new order provided for even less stability than in the past. Hitler and then Stalin became the ultimate beneficiaries.

With the advent of the European Union and the peaceful demise of the USSR, without a general war, the Continent had been extended a new opportunity to solve its problems. Nevertheless, the signs, alas, point to a repetition of the past.

The Union’s western founding members possess a magnetic attraction for the nations that have been freed from Soviet tutelage as the result of the Cold War victory. This attraction is partly an economic one. To “buy into” a successful franchise is tempting for poor societies that have missed several decades of organic development while subjugated. This is a major asset and it should be used.
 
A further “major asset” to be made into chips to stabilize a zone with 100 million inhabitants is security-related. Central and eastern Europe suffer from a collective memory defined by abusive great powers and the hostility of neighbors. Historically great powers – and local major powers – have not taken long to exploit the opportunity to trawl in a pond filled with small fish eager to bite. Understandably, the unease is general. In this situation the EU – in part due to its overestimated affiliation with NATO – appears to have the power to protect the states of Europe’s central region without wanting to subjugate them. In an interesting departure from the pattern of the past, the EU (and naturally the US) is the first great power that has to be “invited in” instead of being hell-bent to barge into the region.

An affiliation with the EU being coveted, Brussels benefits from a striving that should be converted into an asset. This political capital could have been used to limit the chauvinistic and dictatorial tendencies elaborated above. It is imperative to exploit the chance to overcome a pattern bequeathed by history, by accepting only new members that are at peace among themselves and within themselves. At this juncture we also encounter general EU interests. When extending membership, an effective union should raise the question whether the candidate fits into the existing compact. The EU’s success will not be determined by its size but by its ability to integrate new societies without lowering the original Club’s standards. Therefore, what does not fit should not be let in. Brussels should have been more selective in its past policy on membership. It would also have been wise to be more discriminating in how it extends the hope of admittance.

The time to implement elementary rules is before admittance and not after entry. Leverage should be used while one has it. As things stand, it seems that in setting and enforcing its criteria, the EU have concentrated on some areas and ignored others. Even within this one-sidedness, the standard of judgment regarding economic compatibility has been cursory. The same holds for “democracy.” Once a few formal norms of majority rule were superficially met, political correctness dictated that a pass grade be handed out. This approach saved various ruling groups from being chided and Brussels was spared the complaints of insulted elites. Meanwhile, solving problems by politely declaring them to be non-substantial, the social-political ailments and risks handed down by a tradition that is hard to praise, remain ignored.

Specifically the failure to make the correct treatment of minorities a sine qua non for candidates is the Achilles heel of the EU’s expansion. This is all the more amazing as the past provides plenty of evidence of the damaging consequences of mismanaged minority policies. EU membership in itself will not remedy the ailment. Here the expectations of the US’s Founding Fathers that slavery would be overcome through a natural process once the union was in place, provides a good analogy. Several new and prospective members of the EU are not homogenous national states. Frequently the view of the majority – which is often a minority in some districts – is that their minorities, actually infiltrators, live where they are allowed to stay and that these are tolerated only by the grace of the people of state. Extending a few formal “privileges” is sufficient to “get away with it” under the EU’s perfunctory supervision.

Not surprisingly, a policy to grant meaningful “rights” is hardly in place. It has not been necessary in the past and it is not seriously demanded and enforced at present. Not solving the ethnic problem by deportation or by extermination is regarded as sufficient largesse – except for some notorious slip ups, some of which are remembered while others are officially erased from memory. In some capitals free use of the minority’s language and unhindered schooling in it counts as an extravagant expectation, and often so does the practice of their religion. This is especially the stance of political parties whose core agenda is to save the country by keeping the “foreigners” down. In some countries the demand for local autonomy and self government, as is practiced in Southern Tyrol, are genuinely considered to be milestones on the road to the intended destruction of their state. In part the force behind the reluctance to accept minority rights is based on the inherited deficiencies of the region’s political culture.

This little story makes the point. A prominent journalist known to the writer once carried out an experiment. He told the chauvinistic “leader” of a country that he had an idea how to handle the large and systematically disadvantaged minority his land was “suffering from.” He then related to the man briefly the Swiss system of federalism, without mentioning that what he was presenting as a theory has been practised for generations. The man listened carefully and opined in the end that this was nice but like all dreams, it just cannot work in practice.

Unfortunately “Europe’s” attempt to deal with the problem by pussyfooting it instead of applying pressure to achieve solutions emits the wrong signal. Given the frame of mind of only too many politically uncouth local leaders, the circle made by the EU around this “inadequacy” is not interpreted as a courtesy allotting more time. Instead it is registered as a conniving wink to continue in the old and only way against the riff-raff that are spoiling the purity of the Fatherland.

The features to be implemented if an expanded Europe is to be stable, free of tension, and ultimately prosperous, are simple to state and apparently hard to realize. What is needed is a nudge to break with the goal of overcoming existing diversity by creating homogeneous national states through pressure. This requires that the role of borders be reconsidered by most of the new member countries. Borders must become in the minds of the political classes lines demarcating political sovereignties. Borders are not ethnic boundaries. In the case of national groups who live on the “right” or the “wrong” side of the line, the boundary must be allowed to become irrelevant in the conduct of local affairs. For an individual it should not be of decisive consequence in which country his house stands.  Just as in the case of, shall we say Danes living in Schleswig-Holstein, the border must not have an impact on personal and collective self-determination. Once this is achieved, living in minority status – probably separated only by an arbitrary line from the state of one’s ethnic kin – will cease to be a “punishment.” In this way people originally frustrated by being made subject of an alien state, will have reason to feel like citizens of what is evolving to become, through applied pluralism, their country, too. The dangerous issue of contesting existing borders will disappear. Concurrently, the hysterical existential fear of those whose possessions are in danger of being contested, will ebb away.

The core-EU’s perfunctory treatment of the collective rights issue in and among its new and prospective members can only partly be excused by lack of information as a result of Soviet rule. During that intermezzo Moscow suppressed the discussion of violated minorities – without doing much to discourage the practice. However, old and new information regarding the festering sores is available. By looking and listening a lot more could be ascertained. Overlooking the complaints of minority communities, politely labelling the issue as an “internal affair,” or demonstrating a lack of interest, will not give the central zone of Europe time to “outgrow” its chronic illness. Inaction will make matters worse to the point where the discord might, as it has before, rise to the surface. Ignoring the problem is only a tiny bit easier than principled action to facilitate a solution would be at this opportune juncture. Postponing action into the future will mean that effective palliative measures become difficult. Skeletons have a disturbing habit of falling out of the cupboards where the naive think they have banished them.