All along, there have been convincing reasons to be skeptical about the future to which Arab resistance has opened the door. Earlier, some aspects of these concerns had already been elaborated in this column.

Revolutions are not to be measured by the detail that subsequent commemorative national holidays emphasize. That celebrated component of the revolutionary process is the overthrow of the “old régime”. Granted, there is no revolution if the old system is not ousted. However, crushing the old system of government does not guarantee the ultimate success of the upheaval. At least not by the standards of the terms by which it defined its goals during the upheaval’s first and violent phase. The analogy is a sailboat race. To become a participant you have to get the vessel’s hull wet. After that comes the crucial part which includes manning the boat and holding it on course.

Especially in the case of Libya, where the tyrant’s resistance had been the most dogged, can one discern the deficits of the uprising. The least of these is that, apparently, the elite units have not deserted the Leading Clown that manages the country as a family enterprise wearing a doorman’s uniform. The “Revolution Leader’s” ability to recruit alien mercenaries that are immune to conversion by local sentiment, has not been undermined. Apparently, his ability to pay with money hoarded within the country had been helpful. The freezing of the dictatorships funds abroad have little effect on the Thief’s ability to pay. Much damage could have been inflicted by spreading a rumor. It would have been that the distributed money is marked. As such, it will not be accepted abroad. Regrettably, no one locally thought of this trick of psychological warfare.

Unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the determination of Kaddafi to slaughter his own people once it proved undeserving of his guidance has been an advantage. Equally important was that Kaddafi seems to have had two armies. In true totalitarian manner, a difference can be made between the army of the state and the ruling gang’s private army. Training and equipment standards diverged between these two competing branches of the armed forces. In this respect, analogies exist. The juxtaposition of the Wehrmacht and Hitler’s party-armies, especially the SS and Waffen SS, will be familiar to the reader.

In any case, through luck and by design, those components of the armed forces that can be decisive under Libya’s geographic conditions have remained under government control. Therefore, an old story seems to repeat itself in the theater that once pitted the Africa Corps’ Panzers against Montgomery’s tanks and planes. With the superior firepower, the armor and the control of the air space, the defeat of the rebels is foreseeable at the time this is written on March 14th.

The uprising has two crucial problems to overcome. Depending on the perspective of the analyst, these could be rated as being more decisive than the access to military equipment. Briefly put, the rebels have the wrong people and even more so, the wrong friends. Let me elaborate.

To prevail, revolutions need to have “revolutionary discipline”. Its source can be a preparedness to submit personal inclinations to the interests of the community or an idea that has the commitment of society. A spontaneous and strongly felt sense of honor to do ones duty can be widespread and may determine the priorities of the persons caught up in the events. Your correspondent has fought under such conditions and so he knows that people so “possessed” are easy to command and find satisfaction in doing “the right thing”. Actually, a “we do not steal” principle has almost caused the writer’s demise. It happened while marching with a crew by a store that had taken a large caliber hit. Its shop window was smashed. In the display stood, in a broken container, what has been a glass of cherries. Since I was famished, I reached in and grabbed a few of the scattered fruits. Some comrades reacted by wanting to shoot me for “looting” and violating the “revolutions honor”.

The disparity of forces, our improvised “National Guard” vs. the Red Army on the one hand, and Kaddafi’s loyalists pitted against the rebels is not comparable. However, we were easy to command and even initiated spontaneous military and administrative hierarchies.

Watching the event on TV, it is apparent that the chaos of rebel fighters is not of the creative sort that can be a natural consequence of improvisation. Much rather, instead of experimenting with the creation of new structures, the general inclination to do their thing when teamwork is needed, is apparent. Successful revolutions replace one order with another. Libya’s insurgents have not managed to go beyond the initial state when an old order is challenged by disobedience and disorder. To obey and serve in the interest of something is harder for some than it is to risk their lives for it. Symptomatic of destructive individualism is the inclination of participants to fire volleys into the air while shouting “Allah Akbar” to express their mood, manhood and determination. With ammunition running low, such kid stuff is a no-no. One understands the complaints of trained soldiers that they are unable to lead the armed crowd they nominally command. It is difficult to win what would have to be set-piece battles with cannon fodder alone.

Even more serious than the excesses of untamed enthusiasm is that the Libyan people have friends regarding whom they could wish that these would be the enemy. Yes, all those that have bent their back to secure the “Eccentric-in-Chief’s” business, money, alms, or tolerance have now spat out their past subservience. With their throat cleared, they shout their support for the insurgents and holler their long-standing contempt for the oppressor. One would think that this sentiment would be converted into the kind of support the uprising needs. However, if carefully and realistically evaluated, the moral outrage served in legalistic wrapping appears to be more an excuse for inaction than a sign of the intent to intervene.

What could and should the world do to put its actions where its moral mouth is? The repeatedly invoked closing of Libyan air space would weaken Kaddafi in a way his local antagonists, no matter how determined and astute, have no chance of accomplishing. Needless to say, the needed strategic measures against loyalist ordnance required besides shooting down planes, would tip the balance. What are we getting instead? Little beyond transparent excuses. Nato, the Arab League and the US insist on acting only with the SecCouncil’s approval. Thereby in theory they are standing up erect for decency while they raise a practical precondition that  -thanks are due to Russia and China- cannot be met. The scene reminds one of a dog that barks at a larger one from behind a fence. If the will to act would be there then the AL’s call for intervention would go a long way. Concurrently, why not follow for once France’s example and recognize the rebels’ provisional government. Thereafter, the new Libyan government can proclaim a no-fly zone and ask the international community to enforce it. With that, fragile Arab pride would be intact, the charge of intervention –as in “neo-colonialism”- would dissipate and a major international mischief-maker could be toppled.

Forget the EU. Reservations regarding Nato’s worth have been warranted in the past. If Nato and America are incapable to act against Libya then we need to raise a question. Against what and where are these powers able to score?

While you ponder that one, the likely scenario is emerging. Conveniently (here the writer hopes to be proven wrong)  it will be determined that it has been “impossible” to act in time. So, instead of helping the Libyans to avoid slaughter, as a consolation prize, they will be given bandages to treat their wounds.