A low-volume echo to an ongoing major trend.

From the outset, North America has been a purposeful experiment. It was to prove that Europe’s best ideas were viable after a start from scratch. 

To proceed, we need a working designation of what “Europe” means. Along with “Western Civilization”, we like to use the term loosely. When we call Europe the “West”, we add the Americas, Australia, and New Zeeland. This separates Europe from its geographical anchor and suggests a civilization defined by change and mobility. We can continue by applying the criteria to include other “progressive” world neighborhoods. In doing so, we imply the membership of Japan, National China, Korea, Singapore. Reaching ahead to what is to follow, the reader notes how many non-European components are included. As things stand, it might be desirable to replace the term “Europe” and “West” with a new term. It would need to be cognizant that the essentials of what has once been a western monopoly – material progress and political democracy- have cut its umbilical cord to Europe and its ethnicities.  

With the spread of the zone of progress in knowledge, wealth and liberties, it is only natural that dividing lines emerge that correspond to the subdivisions of the zone. An especially critical one is the evolvement of the transatlantic relationship. 

During the American Civil War Britain and France considered but finally avoided intervention although their interests and values bound them to the Confederacy. In the “Great War”, at first the ties, as expressed in “blood is thicker than water”, had a limited effect. Then a combination of presidential preferences and the shortsightedness of the German General Staff dragged the US’ into the war. After the outbreak of peace and reacting to a treaty that capitalized on America’s reputation to hide a content designed to guarantee French supremacy, the States retreated into their traditional neutrality. 

Again, in the third year of a world war, America, once Roosevelt abandoned the substance neutrality, was pushed into the conflict. This shows how difficult it is for a great power to remain neutral in a global war. Recall here that the decision was Tokyo’s and not Washington's. Furthermore, it was an Asian crisis that predated the European conflict, that led to America’s entry into a two front war waged across the Pacific and the Atlantic. True to the pattern, the end of hostilities prompted a hurried move to “bring the boys back home” that worsened the post-war situation in Europe. The error shows that the USA, with the “Bomb” a superpower, remained even with her global monopoly, a reluctant world leader.

DDR propaganda poster: "Ami Go Home"

This time the preferred non-involvement was of short duration. The rise of Communist China and the pressure of Soviet expansion compelled America to return to the world stage. This reluctance made the popular graffiti, “Ami go home” rather redundant. Breaking with the tradition of preferred neutrality, the unwilling superpower entered a number of peacetime military alliances (Nato in Europe, Seato in the Pacific) to contain Russia and China. 

These collective security arrangements, produced success, and failure. The main success is the collapse of the Soviet system. America might have won the hotly contested Cold War in that China’s “national communist capitalism” could signal that the systemic element behind the confrontation is weakening. (For pessimists, Communism bolstered by capitalist efficiency points to a coming conflict in which Peking will be stronger than Moscow has ever been.) Crediting Nato with the success in Europe requires caution. The European members’ contributions were as limited as was their support for American engagements (Korea, Viet Nam). This could move observers to find that unconditional support from overseas has spoiled the Europeans. If so, the consequence of Nato is that it educated Europe to be materially and morally unwilling and unable to defend itself. 

A recent announcement had news for an under-attentive world. It is that America has searched for her identity and that it has found it. Accordingly, the US regards itself as a country of the Pacific region. Therefore, she will reduce her presence in Europe. Europeans tend to see America as condemned to play a role in Europe as the laid back zone’s protector. Majority-type Americans also see their country as bound to the “old world”. Nevertheless, the announcement points to crucial consequences even if that part that sees America’s “Manifest Destiny” in the Pacific is hardly new. Already in 1898, the “Turner Thesis” has recognized the consequences of America’s expansion that moved her away from Europe. Even in the late fifties, the writer’s West-Coast university required for graduation in his major a course in East Asia. The consequences are clear. Nevertheless, it has been difficult to convince Europeans that America has alternatives to Europe and also major non-European interests as well as responsibilities. It has been equally futile to plead that the American threat to the comfortable conditions enjoyed for little in return came not from her imperial “interventionism” but from “isolationism”. 

Giving notice of the reorientation will only make an impression once the consequences emerge. Loosened ties to Europe terminate an unhealthy relationship. Sixty-five-years after the war, a quarter century after the dissolution of the system that threatened Europe’s states and the economic order, it is time for the parties to go it alone. Given the size and the wealth of the EU, the continuation of American commitment at a level that the protected are unwilling to match, is unjustified. The hither arrangement has been bad for Europe as it prevented seemingly unnecessary exertions for self-protection. At the same time, dependence created an anti-American reaction that extends beyond leftist circles. This demonstration of “independence”, proven by ingratitude, responded to a psychological need. The action had the advantage that it was “easier” than would have been assertive self-sufficiency with local means. 

From the point of view of the USA, putting light between itself and Europe has its benefits. More freedom of movement from an emancipated Europe will help America to be an effective defender of democracy and of an advanced economic order against its totalitarian, fanatical, and collectivistic challengers. In the past, there has been only a dearth of support from Europe when America rose to answer the call. (Korea, Viet Nam, SDI in he past, Iran in the future.) A bad ally is worse than an enemy is as it creates iniquitous obligations. Therefore, it is to be hoped that Europe will, as it needs to, learn to swim again. Getting wet in the process will be unpleasant but ultimately hardly of any harm.