The Road Untaken
From the desk of Joshua Trevino on Wed, 2006-10-25 12:48
As we move inexorably toward defeat in Iraq – and let’s call it what it is, “withdrawal” or no – we must remember one thing above all else: the defeat was chosen, not imposed, and as such it brings with it vastly more dishonor than a loss by force of arms. The cardinal virtue of President Bush hitherto has been his refusal to lose – but it is a dubious virtue in the absence of a will to win. (These half-virtues are a curious feature of his presidency: see, for example, his tax-cutting zeal, coupled with his utter disinterest in spending cuts.)
This war has been an exercise in conquest on the cheap, and as such, foreseeably bad compromises were made: first to under-man the occupation force, then to abandon Fallujah (twice!), then to allow Moqtada al-Sadr to live (three times!), then to push unready Iraqi units to the fore, et cetera. We can allow the President the usual mistakes of wartime – certainly it took Lincoln long enough to find the right generals – but we cannot credit him if he does not learn from them. Three and a half years into this war, it’s quite clear that he has learned little.
The fundamental strategic flaw in the American war effort has always been one of under-manning coupled with a too-soft approach to the civilian population in which the insurgency thrives. This last may seem grotesque in light of the recent Lancet study alleging c.600,000 civilian deaths in Iraq since 2003 (which, unlike most of my conservative colleagues, I suspect is not wildly off the mark), but the point is not to urge killing or repression of civilians for its own sake. Rather, the point is to do what it takes to win. In this case, with a popular resistance to occupation and ethnic divisions at play, the applicable counterinsurgency models are Algeria and South Africa.
In the former, the French military was able to seal Algerian borders to virtually end the influx of weapons and men to the FLN; and they put more Muslims under arms for France – the harkis – than fought for independence. (Algeria was lost due to French politics rather than military events, so we may still look to it for pragmatic lessons on the latter front.)
In the latter, the Boer War period saw the Afrikaner nation virtually united in its opposition to British conquest. The exploits of the Boer guerrilla columns were models for insurgencies in the subsequent century, tying down nearly a quarter-million Imperial soldiers in pursuit of a few thousand horsemen. The British did what they had to do to win: they separated the women and children from the men, and caused the veld to be strewn with barbed wire and blockhouses. It was massive, it was expensive, it was heartbreaking, and it worked. A decade later, South African units went into battle for the King in the First World War.
Iraq will never be a stalwart friend of America as South Africa was to the British from 1902 to 1960. But it could be something benign, and even generally laudable, if won. Conceptually, the Algerian-style sealing of Iraqi borders coupled with Boer War-style civilian control measures are workable and even just. The problem is that their imposition would mean the implicit repudiation of the very mythos of the war: that it was a liberation, and that all men yearn to be free in the Western liberal sense. Some peoples very much like their cages, whether it be Ba’athist or Islamist, and will fight for admission to them. It was the unwillingness to concede the error of this point that first drove the President to refuse the hard path to victory in favor of his policy of attrition and groundless hope. Now that things have come this far, with a Congress shortly to be lost and an American people who no longer trust him, he does not even have the option to try. The pity of it all is that those who pay the inevitable price will be the very Iraqis whom he hoped to free.
Brilliantly expressed --and sadly correct
Submitted by Kierkegaard on Sun, 2006-10-29 15:53.
As Eureferendum points out, there is still a third option--to 'redeclare' war and actually wage it to win. Further, there is a fourth option, never mentioned by anyone else, that should be on the table: to annex as US territories parts of Iraq paid for with the blood of our soldiers and all but empty of population anyway.
Why not? It might prove the most popular course in the long run.
Genghis again
Submitted by marcfrans on Thu, 2006-10-26 20:54.
@ Snorri Godhi
Using violence will almost always "serve a purpose". That is not unique to Genghis Kahn. Behind most violence lies someone's "purpose". The relevant question is about the nature of the purpose and it's moral 'legitimacy'. What makes you say (implicitly) that the purposes of Genghis Kahn were 'good'? I doubt that (1) Genghis never used violence without purpose, as you claim, and I doubt even more (2) that his "teaching of lessons" had always a good purpose.
The analogy with modern 'deterrence' and 'pre-emption' is intriguing, but difficult to make. One does not have to 'conquer' violently most of the (known) world to ensure own survival. But one surely must pre-empt those who want to destroy you before they can actually do so.
Conclusion: Gengis Khan was probably not always a 'good' guy, but head-in-the-sand attitudes of contemporaries vis-a-vis manifest enemies are always 'bad'.
@marcfrans
Submitted by Snorri Godhi on Fri, 2006-10-27 11:19.
Using violence will almost always "serve a purpose".
Not true: violence always HAS a purpose, in the mind of some idiot, but rarely serves THAT purpose. As evidence, consider the whole of human history.
Genghis Kahn #2
Submitted by marcfrans on Thu, 2006-10-26 17:47.
@ Snorri Godhi
....
With regard to Irak, rehashing the pre-war debate at this stage does not make any sense. One must make practical decisions on the basis of current conditions. "Leaving now" would strengthen the hands of both sunni jihadis and of the theocrats in Iran. Rather than seeking "democracy" the US (and its few true allies in the 'coalition') should openly lower its goal and seek to secure its own interests rather than that of 'ingrates'. This would involve a realistic assesment of who its true friends are in Irak and support them. In practice that would mean a retreat to 'Kurdistan' and maintaining a presence in a part of Baghdad (as a 'bargaining chip' to be bartered away with the strongmen who will inevitably rise up in the remainder of Irak). 'Strongmen' always rise in the Arab world. No doubt, such a partial retreat would inevitably result in civil war between sunni and shiites and even within those two groups. A division of Irak would certainly be in the interest of the west as a whole as long as Iran can be kept at bay. The latter subgoal can be ensured through temporary 'alliances' with the emerging strongmen.
There is a need to return to Kissingerian power balancing policies and less idealism. Long-term self-interest is a proper guiding post for western democracies. And that involves rewarding 'responsible friends' and effectively punishing irresponsible enemies. It does not involve impossible goals of turning totalitarians into democrats.
Given that shortsighted European governments by and large are not willing to impose effective sanctions on Iran, one should have no illusion that Iran will be 'deterred'. That means that the west will not act in unison to "punish irresponsible enemies", and that will mean that world war 3 will become inevitable due to Iranian actions.
Genghis Kahn
Submitted by marcfrans on Thu, 2006-10-26 17:01.
@ Snorri Godhi
I think that you make a lot of sense in your comments, although I disapprove of your admiration for Genghis Kahn. Indeed, your opposition to "turning ruthless" suggests a certain internal mental conflict and that your Khan admiration is purely romantic and/or irrational. I also disagree with your conclusion of recommending just "leaving".
The removal of Saddam's tyranny was properly defended 'ex ante' on moral grounds, on legal grounds, and on security grounds. However, the publicly-stated goal of creating "democracy" in the Middle East was always unrealistic, and remains so today. Democracy is simply incompatible with the existing muslim mindset. As an official goal it was pushed by the 'neocons' (original leftists with a do-gooder mindset turned 'hawkish' on foreign policy vis-a-vis third world dictators), and was never endorsed by foreign policy 'realists'.
It is true that the west can never be truly 'safe' as long as totalitarianism reigns in the mislim world, in China, and in some other places as well. And, it is also true that many current rulers in the Middle East have generally played a 'double game', fostering terrorism against the west to deflect criticism of - or to justify - their own specific rule (which in the 'islamist' mind is an obstacle to their transnational world Khalifat).
The proper response to these conditions is to induce 'responsible behavior' of governments in the nondemocratic world. That involves effective punishments for 'bad' dictators and 'rewards' for good ones, while always continuing to verbally upholding democracy as an ideal.
....
marcfrans vs. Genghis
Submitted by Snorri Godhi on Thu, 2006-10-26 17:14.
Hi: there is no conflict between my opposition to ruthlessness in Iraq, and my admiration for Genghis Kahn. He never used violence unless he thought that it served a purpose. (The purpose was usually to teach a lesson.) Also, I do not recommend leaving Iraq BUT I would recommend it, if the only alternative is to use the methods of the Boer War.
What would Genghis Kahn do?
Submitted by Snorri Godhi on Thu, 2006-10-26 16:02.
As I understand this article, the Iraqis would have benefited from more ruthless American repression. Maybe, but now it's up to them to elect a ruthless government, if they think it's good for them. Better for the Iraqis to take responsibility for the choices that affect them.
Then there is the question of what is good for the USA, or the West in general. As an admirer of Genghis Kahn, I do not shrink from ruthlessness, but it has to be used to good purpose. What good would ruthlessness in Iraq do to us, now or at any point in time? the objective was to get rid of Saddam, and that has been achieved. Now, if we cannot keep the peace in Iraq with a "soft" approach, we might as well leave, rather than turning ruthless.
I also think that the analysis of the Algerian and Boer wars are too simplistic. Let's learn from winners, rather than losers!
Iraq was a Well-Intentioned Mistake
Submitted by Flemish American on Wed, 2006-10-25 20:57.
I have the unfortunate characteristic of näivity and I wish to continue to believe that George Bush had our best interests at heart when he took the step of war in Iraq. Good intentions do not always mean good deeds and I'm afraid Mr. Bush has put us in a quagmire we cannot expect to step out of very quickly.
Committing our boys to combat is always an awful thing and any man (or woman) who takes the Oath of Office needs to be prepared to do it, but show Solomon's Wisdom about when.
My gut tells me that we made the decision for the right reasons, but with the wrong information and that we and our children will be paying the price for this for a very long time.
Lord, grant me the strength to change the things I can;
the serenity to deal with the things I cannot change;
and the wisdom to know the difference.
Incorrect analysis...
Submitted by Kapitein Andre on Wed, 2006-10-25 16:03.
While there is much to be said of Mr. Trevino's article, troop numbers are not the key here, nor do his case studies apply to Iraq.
In Afghanistan, greater numbers would have surely given victory to the Soviets. Afghanistan was relatively homogenous, despite being infiltrated by Pakistani tribesmen, militants, and extremism. Once anti-Soviet resistance was suppressed, there would be little infighting, save for those groups coming across the Pakistani border, who were largely responsible for Afghan resistance anyways.
In Iraq, however, even if the Coalition suppresses resistance, it then faces bloody factionalism between the Kurds and Arabs, Sunnis and Shi'ites. If it tries to get involved, the resistance cranks back up, if it stays out of it, the resistance blames them for letting it happen.
Why? Because Iraq is an artificial, multinational/ethnic and multi-religious state along Yugoslavian lines. No amount of troops can truly prevent it from tearing itself apart unless it acts like Saddam Hussein, who oppressed Shi'ites and Kurds.
Iraq needs to be carved up. To placate Turkey, American forces will have to remain in Kurdistan to prevent cross-border warfare. Indeed, Coalition forces will have to remain in all three states to ensure than none fall prey to foreign powers (e.g. Iran) or each other.
pay the price
Submitted by peter vanderheyden on Wed, 2006-10-25 13:16.
Perhaps we should asks the Iraqi’s which price they prefer:
"
"The pity of it all is that those who pay the inevitable price will be the very Iraqis whom he hoped to free."
or
the applicable counterinsurgency models are Algeria and South Africa."
"they separated the women and children from the men, and caused the veld to be strewn with barbed wire and blockhouses." (and dead bodies as 25% of women ans children in these camps died. A minor point, not really important, but nevertheless...)