Airport Security: No Empty Bottles, Please
From the desk of Filip van Laenen on Tue, 2006-11-28 22:37
Yesterday afternoon, I returned to Oslo from a short trip to Flanders. These days, airport security is mostly focused on preventing people from bringing any potentially liquid substances onto the plane, so I emptied the little bottle of water I had before I proceeded to security control. It didn't help though: the empty bottle was confiscated because, as it happens, empty bottles are on the black list too. I'm not sure whether it were the remaining drops of water inside the bottle, or the possibility that I would fill the bottle up with water again afterwards, but I certainly wasn't allowed to take it along.
The present airport security measures are best described as systemized nonsense. The result of the current "war on liquids" may very well be that it has now become easier than ever to smuggle solid explosives onto a plane. Another result is that the metal detectors currently seem to react at such a low threshold that one doesn't need much more than a simple watch to be taken out of the line for an extra check. There cannot be much time left to watch how people are behaving during security control, even though that is more likely a better way to detect terrorists.
As to the liquids, my impression from a few hours of surfing the Internet is that it is practically impossible to blow up a plane using liquid explosives. Basically these kinds of explosives can be divided into two classes: either they are so unstable that one needs almost an entire chemical laboratory to bring them onto the plane safely, or they are so stable that they require a strong detonator which would certainly be noticed at the security control. The present security measures have been motivated more by incompetence and panic – always a bad combination – than by anything else. That some British would-be terrorists had absolutely no sense for practical chemistry does not seem to me a good enough reason for confiscating tubes of toothpaste and bottles of water at airports all over the world.
But let us presume, for the sake of the argument, that there is a case for screening all sorts of liquids, would it then make sense to confiscate empty bottles? None of the people involved yesterday afternoon doubted that my bottle really was empty, i.e. that there was no liquid in it and that I could not do anything dangerous with it on the plane. Actually, you can buy lots of bottles full of water a few yards from the security control. The message I got was that empty bottles were on the list, and therefore I couldn't take it with me. I wonder who put it on the list in the first place. The only thing I can imagine is that empty bottles are forbidden by association: liquids are dangerous, liquids can be transported in bottles, therefore bottles are dangerous too. What will be next? Am I still allowed to carry empty boxes? You never know there may be a terrorist out there planning to smuggle explosives onto a plane using a box…
MUCA and POCO v Realism
Submitted by Flanders Fields on Wed, 2006-11-29 14:45.
The airport "security" measures are not designed for real and practical security. They are demonstrations of multiculturalism(mucu) and political correctness(poco). We are to beleive that it is a more important function of government to protect rights of minorities(even where minorities amount to majorities), than to do the main function that has always been the governments of the past and that is to protect their individual citizens from those attempting to do them grevious injury or harm.
It is no longer tolerated that people look at other people and judge how likely they are to harm you on the basis of skin color, language, religious or other clothing, sex, age or activities. You or your wife or your young child are as likely to be a terrorist in the eyes of those in mucu-poco government as the person of mid-eastern physical characteristics wearing long robes with religious symbolism(other than christian), shouting Al Akbar with a group of others of the same demeanor. Real risk factors must be replaced with something so there can be an assertion that everything was being done according to standard proceedures when the terrorists do blow up or hijack the next plane(s). You can rest assured that there will be more intensive classes in multicultural political correctness for security personnel when that does happen.
Liquid terrorists
Submitted by George2 on Wed, 2006-11-29 13:33.
Good people are forbidden to carry any substances that possibly could be used for a terrorist attack. I can live with that. I cannot live with the fact that people are not screened for being potential terrorists (e.g. extremist Muslims)and forbidden to enter the European Union.
Designed by ignorant bureaucrats
Submitted by sepex on Tue, 2006-11-28 23:12.
I also doubt the effectiveness of the current security measures, other than to annoy honest people. For how long will they swallow the argument "it's for your security, it's for your own good"? These measures are obviously designed by politicians and their bureaucrat cronies who are not restrained by any actual knowledge about airport operations, chemistry, explosives, terrorism,...
If you took a short trip from Norway to Belgium and back, the worst thing must of course be that you can not take back home a small supply of good and cheap Belgian beer without checking it in ... :-)